グループ認知モデルを用いた社会現象の創発に関するエージェントベースシミュレーション by MAHARDHIKA DIPTA & マハルディカ ディプタ
博士論文 
 
 
 
 
An Agent-Based Simulation of the Emergence of  
Societal Phenomena Using a Group Cognition Model 
 
(グループ認知モデルを用いた社会現象の創発に関する 
エージェントベースシミュレーション) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
マハルディカ ディプタ 
 
 
  
  
 An Agent-Based Simulation of the Emergence of Societal 
Phenomena Using a Group Cognition Model 
(グループ認知モデルを用いた社会現象の創発に関する 
エージェントベースシミュレーション) 
 
 
by: 
 
Dipta Mahardhika 
37-147251 
 
 
 
 under the supervision of: 
 
Associate Professor Taro Kanno 
Professor Kazuo Furuta 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted for a partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy in the field of Systems Innovation 
 
 
Department of Systems Innovation 
Graduate School of Engineering 
The University of Tokyo 
 
August 2017 
  
  
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
First and foremost, praises and thanks to the Lord the Almighty for providing me this 
opportunity and granting me the capability to finish this doctoral thesis. Without His grace 
and blessing, this research would not be completed. 
This thesis would not be completed as well without help from various sources. Therefore, 
hereby I would like to express my deepest gratitude to the following: 
1. The University of Tokyo for providing the scholarship for my PhD study 
through the Foreign Student Special Fellowship program 
2. The Cognitive Systems Engineering Laboratory, for making the research 
possible. 
3. My academic supervisors, Associate Professor Taro Kanno and Professor Kazuo 
Furuta, for giving guidance and advice throughout this research.  
4. Yumika Suzuki, for helping me conduct some parts of the simulation. 
5. My parents, sister, and brother, for giving me mental support even though they 
are far away in our homeland. 
6. All my friends from KKIT for always cheering me up through fresh jokes and 
also interesting philosophical discussions.  
7. KN, for her love, support, and encouragement during my study and life. 
and to all other people who gave me help, support, and encouragement, either directly or 
indirectly. Even though their names cannot be listed here one by one, I also would like to 
give my sincere gratitude to them.  
Thank you. ありがとうございました。Terimakasih. 
 
Tokyo, August 2017 
DIPTA MAHARDHIKA 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Phenomena like norms, public opinions, and social movements are based on individual 
actions and their interactions as the building blocks. Usually the interactions are modeled 
by creating some agents that are more influential than others. In this study, the emergence 
of such phenomena is modeled as a bottom-up process where all agents have an equal level 
of influence on each other. There is also no leading agent that can coordinate, reward, or 
punish other agents. A group-cognition model based on the concept of mutual belief and 
mental subgrouping is used as the basis to understand bottom-up emergence of societal 
phenomena in an agent society. By using the concept of mutual belief and mental 
subgrouping, this study attempts to model the mechanism of how individual decision 
making and incomplete interaction between the agents shape a societal phenomenon. 
‘Mutual belief’ describes agents’ interaction as a set of individual cognition and belief about 
other agent’s cognition. ‘Mental subgrouping’ describes the strategy of aggregating such 
belief when there are many other agents to interact with. The model is implemented in a 
multi-agent simulation and norm emergence is simulated under various cognitive strategies 
based on the proposed model. The result shows that mental subgrouping and awareness to 
other agents’ expectation prevent the society to overconsume common resources, even 
though there is no leading agent and the communication between agents are not perfect. 
 
Keywords: Norm emergence, Group cognition model, Multi agent simulation, Social 
simulation  
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Chapter I 
INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Background 
In a society with free (autonomous) agents, each individual agent is pursuing his/her own 
goal. Even though their goals are not necessarily the same (unlike teams), the pursue of 
one’s goal can hinder other’s pursue of other’s goal. Therefore, a coordination between the 
agents is very important. Such coordination can be done in several different ways.  
The most common way is by establishing an institution to control the autonomous agents. 
An example of this method is the establishment of a government in a country. A government 
creates rules to control the interaction between citizens, such as traffic rules in the case of 
coordinating citizens’ behavior on the road. The government decides what kind of driving 
behavior is right or wrong. It decides which side of line the people should drive, the 
maximum speed, and so on. To avoid conflict, the citizens can simply follow the rule made 
by the government.  
This method is simple and effective but may not work in all situations. One factor is the 
cost to enforce the law. Due to the size of the society, it may not be possible for the 
government to monitor the behavior of every citizen. Another factor is that people may not 
want to be controlled by the government in every aspect of their life. 
Another method of coordination is by establishing a norm. One example is the norm to 
form a line while waiting. Such kind of coordination cannot be controlled by the 
government because it is impossible to monitor every single occasion that requires lining 
up. The norm to line up was probably not decided by an institution, nor the result of explicit 
coordination between all members of the society. Each member of the society has the option 
of either to defect by cutting the line or cooperate by forming the line. However, in any 
society usually it is quite easy to find out whether the norm is to line up or not.   
Some societies may already take the line-up norm for granted. They do not need to 
deliberate about which action is the right thing to do (line up or not) because the norm is 
already established. Some other societies might think the opposite, in which not forming a 
line is the norm. In some countries, people get used to compete and fight to be the first in 
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line instead of queuing. Nevertheless, in both cases, tracing back how such norm 
established is difficult.  
There are still cases where the society is still struggling in establishing a norm to coordinate 
the action of all society members. Innovations in industry force the society to create a new 
norm in handling new problems caused by those innovations. Online social media is one 
example of this kind of problem.  
Social media is a relatively new phenomenon. It allows people to interact anonymously 
and asynchronously. Such a method of interaction triggers many problems, such as the 
Online Disinhibition Effect (ODE), where people tend to behave more intensely than they 
would in person (Suler, 2005). 
There are many serious cases of ODE. In 2013, Justine Sacco, a senior director of an 
internet company jokingly wrote a tweet about her trip to Africa and AIDS. The tweet went 
viral and was responded angrily since many people thought it was offensive and racist. She 
lost her job afterwards. Being online made her feel that she could be more freely in 
expressing her thought (Ronson, 2015). Similar other cases are Adria Richards cases in 
PyCon Technology Conference 2013 (Ronson, 2015) and Florence, a student in Jogjakarta, 
Indonesia, where she posted an offensive tweet about the city in 2014 (Rakusen, Devichand, 
Sampat, & Susilo, 2014). There was no norm about what can and cannot be posted online, 
in those cases they just did what they thought was fine. Other cases are about impolite 
comments, or other offensive remarks in online social media. Recently there are also cases 
about fake news and hoaxes online, especially related to political event (BBC Asia, 2017). 
There are no norms about the politeness level or about whether it is acceptable or not to 
write fake news. People behave by only following their own intentions. 
Determining a law for cases in the internet is not easy. One reason is the jurisdiction. Since 
such cases do not happen in a particular physical space, it is difficult to define the 
jurisdiction. Other reasons are that most of the cases are not criminal activity, so the law 
cannot punish them. The internet is also too huge to be controlled by a certain institution. 
However, a guideline is indispensable to guide the users what to do while using the internet.   
The struggle to find a guideline in determining what is the correct thing to do is no longer 
an exclusive domain of human agent. Recently there are many smart and autonomous 
devices invented and produced. One popular example is the self-driving car. Self-driving 
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car is designed to response to its environment and react accordingly. In the future, it is 
visioned that those cars will coordinate with each other, instead of only responding to its 
environment (Furda & Vlacic, 2009). The problem with that goal is that not every possible 
situation of interaction and coordination can be decided by design. For example, the self-
driving cars may need to coordinate with each other in determining what is the proper speed 
limit in general. We might be able to learn from how human coordinate with each other to 
decide what is the right thing to do, and implement the mechanism into the autonomous 
agent-society. 
Such guidelines may come up as norms. Norms are societal phenomena that facilitate 
coordination and cooperation among the members of a society. Norms can be loosely 
defined as the understanding of what is the right thing to do given a certain situation. It is 
a mental representation of the appropriate behavior, and plays a role as a guidance for 
people to act (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2003). Sometimes norm is confused with the notion of 
moral virtue, which is based on the sense of what is right or wrong. However, there are 
cases where people understand what should be done in a certain situation by observing 
what other people do in the same situation, even without knowing the morally right thing 
to do (e.g. Goldstein, Cialdini, & Griskevicius, 2008). Moral virtue is usually difficult to 
predict without knowing the base on which the judgment of right or wrong is made, such 
as rule of law or religion. Cialdini (2009) mentioned that in the case where there is no clear 
guidance on what to do, people usually look for clues from other people’s behavior. 
Moreover, people tend to think that what the majority does is the right thing to do. (Further 
discussion about the definition of norms can be found in Section 2.3) 
In many cases, norms are not created as a prescription from an authority (top-down), but 
rather emerge as the result of the interaction between the members (bottom-up). Coleman 
(1990) mentioned that norms are a macro level (societal) construct based on micro level 
(individual) actions. They come into existence through a micro-to-macro transition. It is 
impossible and might not be desirable, for an authority, government for example, to create 
a rule and guidance for everything about the daily lives of the society. Many of society’s 
aspects of life are self-governed.  
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1.2 Multi-Agent Simulation Based on Cognitive Model  
1.2.1 Top-down and bottom-up emergence 
Performing a large-scale experiment to see how norms are formed in a society is difficult. 
We cannot create a new society of many agents that has no institutions or government and 
see how they form a new norm. It is also difficult to isolate factors to see their effect on the 
emergence of norm. Computer simulation has been used to understand the phenomenon 
since 1980s. Researchers use simulations to test their intuition about norms (Neumann, 
2010). Norm simulation is usually done in a multi-agent system. The term NorMAS 
(Normative Multi Agent System) is usually used to describe such system (Savarimuthu & 
Cranefield, 2011).  
From the perspective of how a norm emerges, NorMAS can be categorized into top-down 
and bottom-up emergence. In the top-down mechanism, it is assumed that there is already 
one correct norm in the society. Some superior agents create the norm by using norm 
creation mechanism. Other agents will then detect the norm and apply it to themselves. 
Some agents will also spread the norm to others, and even sanction them. This perspective 
requires the assumption that some agents are initially superior to the others. In this 
perspective, norm is seen as a micro level phenomenon which is later scaled up to the whole 
society to make it a macro level phenomenon. The norm is said to have emerged after it 
has been adopted by a certain number of agents (Hollander & Wu, 2011). Such a process 
adopts a top-down mechanism of the emergence of societal phenomena (Figure I-1).  
 
Figure I-1. Top-down emergence of norm 
(as published in Mahardhika, Kanno, & Furuta (2017)) 
Based on Coleman’s (1990) argument, norms should come into existence in the transition 
process between micro and macro level. In the micro level, no agent possesses any norm. 
They have their choice of actions, but these actions are not the norm until the actions 
undergo a transition process. If this argument is to be followed carefully, emergence of 
norms should focus on this transition process. If it is used as the underlying assumption, all 
agents can be assumed as equal because we do not need superior agents to create, spread, 
11 
and enforce the norms. Such process adopts a bottom-up mechanism of the emergence of 
societal phenomena (Figure I-2).  
 
Figure I-2. Bottom-up emergence of norm 
(as published in Mahardhika, et.al. (2017)) 
1.2.2 Group cognition model 
Several different models have been proposed to study norm emergence using NorMAS. 
Most of the models are based on game-theory (Axelrod, 1986; Sen & Airiau, 2007). Using 
such an approach allows researcher to understand the fundamental process behind the 
phenomena by only using a simple model. Axelrod (1997) used the term KISS (keep it 
simple, stupid!) to refer to such an approach.  
However, Terano (2008) argues that even though KISS approach gives the flexibility to 
researcher in implementing the model and at the same time can give a powerful insight, it 
has its own disadvantage. He argues that the simpler the model, the more explanatory 
interpretation is necessary. To better understand the mechanism of societal, researchers 
should aim not to a simple model, but to find the right trade-off between simplicity and 
explanatory power.  
Game theory approach like the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ game uses one fundamental 
assumption in explaining the agent’s decision making. The assumption is that the only thing 
the agents want is to make maximum profit, given several choices of possible strategies. 
Such a model cannot explain other possible factor in agent’s decision making such as the 
desire to conform, or different perception of agent’s toward the norm. 
Andrighetto et al. (2007; 2010) proposed a cognitive architecture in modeling the agents in 
a norm emergence simulation. This model puts more complexity to better resemble the 
cognitive mechanism in the agent’s decision making. Their architecture is called EMIL 
(Emergence in The Loop). They focused on a process called norm internalization. They 
mentioned that for an agent to obey a norm, it has to not just recognize it but also internalize 
to make it the drive of its action.  
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The fundamental building block of societal phenomena is individual human cognition, such 
as intention, decision, and action. To explain the emergence of norm from this building 
block, it is necessary to use a model that can explain both the individual cognitive processes, 
the interaction between the individuals, and the emergence of the norm. A group cognition 
model can be used for this purpose.  
One example of group cognition model is a model called mutual belief model (Kanno, 
Furuta, & Kitahara, 2013; Mahardhika, Kanno, & Furuta, 2016). This model can explain a 
group cognition from its building blocks, which are the individual cognitive processes and 
the interaction between them. The interaction between the individuals is represented by a 
so-called ‘belief’ among the agents. The modeling approach by reducing the higher level 
process (group cognition) into its building blocks (individual cognition) is called 
reductivist point of view (Chant & Ernst, 2007). 
1.3 Objective of This Study 
As mentioned in Section 1.1, people need guidelines on how to behave when there is new 
technological innovations such as the internet. As an explicit rule of law may not be enough 
to control social media, intervention may need to be done by other institution such as the 
social media company. However, to know what kind intervention is proper, it will be 
necessary to understand the mechanism of how the member of the society, in this case, the 
users of the internet, form a norm.  
Specifically, a particular factor to be understood is how a society can form a norm with the 
limited cognitive capability. A limited cognitive capability hinders the agent to 
communicate with all members of the society. Even when they communicate with a portion 
of the society, they may not be able to communicate their observation to other agents. To 
understand this, we need to observe emergence of norm using a model that models societal 
cognition in their basic building blocks, which is individual cognition. 
To explain the emergence of norms from their basic building blocks, a new approach in 
NorMAS is required. In line with Coleman’s (1990) definition, a bottom-up emergence 
model is more proper in representing the emergence of a norm in a society. A cognitive 
modeling is also required to explain both the individual agent’s decision making process, 
and the micro-to-macro transition into the norm.  
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Thus, the objective of this research is defined as follows. This study aims to understand the 
mechanism of norm emergence by analyzing the transition process between individual 
actions into the society’s norm. In particular, a group cognition model is used to represent 
the individual cognition (actions, intentions) and their interaction. The model is 
implemented in a multi-agent simulation.  
1.4 Structure of Thesis 
In this chapter, a brief introduction about the research has been given to explain the 
motivation behind the research. In Chapter II, a detailed theoretical study covering human 
cognition theory and the studies about norm are presented. It also includes the comparison 
with the current study. Chapter III presents the model of norm emergence proposed by this 
research. This includes the adaptation of the mutual belief model to the norm emergence 
phenomenon. Chapter IV presents the detail of the simulation, including the result and the 
discussion about the result. Chapter V explains the limitation of the current study and 
suggestions for future research. Chapter VI presents the conclusion of the study. 
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Chapter II 
LITERATURE STUDY 
2.1 Levels of Human Cognition Study 
The studies of human cognition can be divided into three different levels: micro level, 
meso-level, and macro level. The micro level studies the cognition of individual human. 
The meso-level studies cognition in the level of a small group or team. The macro level 
studies cognition in a larger scale, i.e., a society. A distinct feature of the macro level 
compared to the meso-level is that each member cannot interact with all of other members, 
but only a portion of it.  
2.1.1 Micro level (individual) 
In the micro level, human cognition study deals with phenomena such as perception, 
memory, and individual decision making (Matlin, 2012). The study seeks to understand 
how humans behave and respond to stimulations from their environment. By understanding 
this, we can help people increase their individual performance, for example by avoiding 
human error. For example, it is well known that humans do not always make a rational 
decision. In most of the time, humans use a so-called System 1, a quick thinking process, 
instead of a slower but more logical System 2 (Kahneman, 2011). Understanding this 
difference will help people avoid biases and errors. 
2.1.2 Meso-level (group / team) 
As a social organism, it is very natural for humans to interact with each other. Cooperation 
between humans allows many great achievements that otherwise could not be achieved 
individually. The studies about human cognition in regards to the relation with each other 
can be divided into two levels: meso-level (group / team) and macro-level (societal).  
An entity with more than one person in it can be called a social-aggregates (Forsyth, 2010). 
Lickel, et. al. (2000) listed four different types of social aggregates: primary group, social 
group, collectives, and categories. By looking at the different characteristics of those 
aggregates in the aspects of social tie, permeability, and time span, Mahardhika and Kanno 
(2016) classifies primary group and social group into “group”, and collectives and 
categories as “society”. 
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Primary group refers to an intimate cluster of close associates, such as families, or close 
friends. This kind of groups tends to have intensive interactions, and those are mostly for 
maintaining the intimate relationship. The size of a primary group is usually small. On the 
other hand, a social group tends to be larger and less intimate than a primary group. This 
kind of group is often task oriented. Some examples are sports group, fraternities, military 
squads, companies, and so on. 
Collectives are usually large, spontaneous social aggregates. The members have a loose or 
no emotional relationship, and are usually strangers to each other. However, they are tied 
to each other by spatial proximity, common rules, norms, or a purpose. Some examples are 
audience of a concert, queue, riot, and so on.  
Social categories are similar to collectives in that the members have no emotional 
relationship. However, they are tied by their similarities or common features, such as 
interest or cultural background. Some examples are Americans, women, fans of a certain 
music group, and so on. It is important to note that if a social category does not have a 
social implication to a ‘member’, then this is not regarded as a social aggregate for this 
particular ‘member’. If the presence of that category influence a member’s behavior 
towards other members or any person outside the category, then it can be called a social 
aggregate. 
The difference between a group and a society is not just about their size. The other 
differences are the degree of how much the individual members know about other members 
personally (social tie), their interactions, their timespan, and their permeability 
(Mahardhika & Kanno, 2016). In the case of a group, it is reasonable to assume that 
everybody knows everybody, or at least most of them. Every interaction done between 
members is recognized as interaction with a particular person(s) that they know. When they 
exchange some information, the information receiver may care about both the content of 
the information and who the information provider is. Each of the member is connected in 
a socially meaningful way.  
Social tie is indicated by more communication in the relation dimension than in the task 
dimension (or at least balanced communication in those two dimensions). This is important 
to maintain the social tie among the members. It is well recognized in the field of team 
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science that both relation-oriented and task-oriented communication are important for the 
team performance (see, for example, Mohammed, Ferzandi, & Hamilton (2010)).  
In the case of a society, the members do not know each other. Interactions in a society are 
content oriented or transactional, since there is no social tie to maintain. When there is an 
information exchange between members, the receiver may only care about the content of 
the information and not about the information provider (who the provider is, and so on). 
One factor that causes the lack of social tie in society is their size. As the number of people 
inside a social aggregate increases, the number of possible interaction increases 
significantly. Since it is difficult to maintain many interactions, it is very natural that in 
larger aggregates, the members will have more difficulty in interacting will other members.    
Researches in the meso-level deals with some phenomena such as social influence, group 
decision making, team performance, and so on. The relationship between micro and meso-
level can be explained well using reductivist point of view (Chant & Ernst, 2007; Tuomela, 
2007). This point of view reduces cognition of a group into the cognition of its members, 
and a certain relationship between them. The relationship can be explained by using a 
concept called mutual belief. The detail of this concept is explained in Section 2.2. 
2.1.3 Macro level (societal) 
Due to its distinct characteristics from the meso-level, there are some phenomena that 
occurs only in the macro-level. Some examples are norms, public opinion, trends, and 
crowd behavior.  
Norm is a guideline about what is right or wrong that is understood by the members of the 
society. The example of norm is the norm to queue when waiting for a train. Definition of 
norm is explained further in Section 2.3. 
The term “public opinion” is usually used in the political field. It refers to the collective 
opinion of the people of a society regarding an issue in the society (Bianco & Canon, 2013). 
Trends refer to a change in opinions, behavior, lifestyle of a large number of dispersed 
individuals (Forsyth, 2010). One example of trend is fashion trends. A certain type of 
fashion can be popular among many individuals in a certain point of time.  
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When many people share a common location and when they have a common focus of 
attention, they become a crowd (Milgram & Toch, 1969). Le Bon (1960) was the first to 
mention that when humans are in crowd, it seems that a sort of ‘collective mind’ emerges 
that makes their behavior different from that when they are alone. Researchers agree that 
this phenomena is triggered by human emotion (as opposed to rational consideration) 
(Blumer, 1951; Freud, 1921). In the extreme cases, human emotion can be accumulated to 
form a different type of crowd which are the panic (triggered by fear), the craze (triggered 
by joy), and hostile outburst (triggered by anger) (Lofland, 1985).  
In the field of social sciences, there are several theories of how macro phenomena can 
happen. They are contagion theory, convergence theory, emergent-norm theory, and value 
added theory. 
Contagion theory says that a large number of people can have a hypnotic influence to affect 
individual action even though initially the individuals do not share a same intention (Le 
Bon, 1960). On the other hand, convergence theory says that societal phenomena happen 
because initially people with similar intention comes together (Dollard & Miller, 1943). 
Emergent-norm theory emphasizes that the members of a large social aggregate initially 
have different interests and motives. When the members find a vague situation, they will 
always search for a norm (Turner & Killian, 1993). In the value-added theory, Smelser 
(Smelser, 1962) argues that collective behavior is a kind of “tension release” within the 
society. In this sense, he argues that the members of the society already have an intention 
to do the collective behavior, but it requires a trigger for that behavior to occur. 
In the current study, we want to explore further the mechanism of the emergent-norm theory. 
We want to use the reductivist point of view to see the relation between individual cognition, 
their interaction, and the emergence of norms. 
2.2 Mutual Belief Model and Mental Subgrouping 
One group cognition model that uses the reductivist point of view is the mutual belief model 
(Kanno, Furuta, & Kitahara, 2013; Mahardhika et al., 2016).  
The model describes ‘group cognition’ as a set of three layers of mental construct and 
cognitive processes, distributed in each group-member’s mind. To explain the structure of 
the model, a group of three members namely A, B, and C is assumed. Figure II-1 shows 
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the schematic representation of A’s part of the team cognition. Figure II-2 shows the 
schematic diagram for the whole group. 
 
 
Figure II-1. Mutual belief model (individual) 
(source: (Mahardhika et al., 2016)) 
 
  
Figure II-2. Mutual belief model (group) 
(source: (Mahardhika et al., 2016)) 
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In Figure II-1, the first layer, namely self-cognition layer, contains A’s own cognition 
excluding belief about other partner’s cognition. This can include A’s situation awareness, 
intention, emotion, perception, etc.   
The second layer, namely direct belief layer, contains A’s belief about his/her partners’ 
cognition. This layer is divided into smaller parts called blocks. Each block contains A’s 
belief about each partner’s cognition, which does not include belief about partner’s belief. 
This may include what A believes about B’s and C’s perception, thoughts, emotion, 
intention, and so on. Because in this case we assume a group of three persons, thus A has 
two partners, hence two blocks in the direct belief layer. The number of blocks is always 
n-1 where n is the group size.  
The third layer is called projected belief layer. This layer consists of several blocks, 
explained as follows. In each column exists two blocks (n-1). For example, if the column 
on the left of direct belief layer represents what A believes about B’s cognition, then the 
blocks on the left column of projected belief layer represents what A believes about what 
B believes about C/A’s cognition. The right column contains what A believes about what C 
believes about B/A’s cognition. The bottommost row of this layer contains A’s belief of 
belief about A’s own cognition. For example, the left bottom block is A’s belief of B’s 
belief about A’s cognition. In the same way, the right bottom block is A’s belief of C’s 
belief about A’s cognition. The row(s) other than the bottommost row contains one’s belief 
of partner’s belief about the other partner’s cognition, such as what A believes about what 
B believes about C’s cognition (left top block). Totally projected belief layer has (n-1)2 
blocks, where n is the size of the group.  
Theoretically, the number of layers can be more than three (such as the belief of belief of 
belief of someone’s cognition). However, three layers are already enough to explain human 
interaction (Kanno, Furuta, & Kitahara, 2013). In a normal situation, people do not even 
pay attention to the status of the third layer (Mahardhika et al., 2016). Besides, it also has 
been proved that average humans can only handle maximum around five layers of such 
structure (Stiller & Dunbar, 2007).  
When the size of a group increases, the number of blocks in layer two and three also 
increases rapidly. To handle this problem, there is a process called ‘mental subgrouping’ 
(Mahardhika, et. al., 2016). ‘Mental subgrouping’ is defined as a mental action in 
individual’s mind of treating several persons as a single entity. It has been proven that this 
is an inherent process in human’s mind. When people interact with one other, they almost 
always create a mental subgroup. Mental subgrouping was observed by the usage of plural 
personal pronouns such as they, we, their, us, and so on. 
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Mahardhika, et. al. (2016) defined one type of mental subgrouping in the direct belief layer 
(‘What I believe about their cognition’), and five types in the projected belief layer. The 
difference between those types is whether the entities are plural or singular. Some examples 
are ‘What I believe he believes about our cognition’, ‘What I believe they believe about 
each other’s cognition’, and so on. 
Like the cognition of a group, the current study also wants to view the cognition of a society 
using the reductivist point of view. The structure of the mutual belief model can be used as 
it is, without any modification. The important characteristic of a society is the huge number 
of partners, thus a large number of blocks in the second and third layer of the model. 
Besides, since the agent cannot be aware of all other agents in the society, mental 
subgrouping process will happen. Thus, in the case of societal cognition, the second layer 
represents ‘What I believe about the society’s cognition’. The third layer represents ‘What 
I believe the society believes about the society’s cognition.’ Since the agent is also part of 
the society, the third layer implicitly represents ‘What I believe the society believes of my 
cognition’. 
One different feature between group cognition and societal cognition is in the way the 
mental subgrouping is formed. In the case of a group, the agents can interact with all other 
agents. From that interaction, the information that the agent gets about other members’ 
cognition is grouped into several mental subgroups. In the case of society, the agent can 
only interact with a portion of the society. To infer the cognition of the whole society (as a 
mental subgroup), the agent can only use the information from the members that it can 
interact with. In real life, this situation can be observed when people mention a stereotype 
of a certain society. For example, people can say “Japanese people likes to wait orderly in 
line”, even though he or she has not met all Japanese people. 
In the emergence of societal phenomena such as norm, each agent in the society will try to 
perceive the expectation of the society. But since they can only interact or observe with 
some of the society’s member, in their view, the expectation of the society is represented 
by these few members.  
The advantage of using mutual belief model to represent cognition of the society is the 
possibility to explain the society’s cognition both in outsider’s perspective and also the 
perspective of the agent itself. 
22 
2.3 Definition of Norms 
In this research, norms are chosen as a study case to represent other societal phenomena. 
The aspect that we want to explore is the emergence of the societal phenomena by using 
the reductivist perspective. In this sense, even though norms and other societal like public 
opinion or crowd behavior have different definitions, they still share one same feature. 
Those phenomena are still composed by the decisions and actions of the individual 
members, thus can be analyzed using the reductivist perspective. 
According to Oxford Learners Dictionary, norms are “standards of behavior that are typical 
of or accepted within a particular group or society” (Bradbery, Turnbull, & Deuter, 1948). 
Cialdini and Trost (1998) emphasize the feature that norms are understood by society 
members and guide their behavior without the force of the law. In the same nuance, Melnyk 
(2011) defines norms as “informal rules and standard”. He also mentioned that one 
important element of norms is the social reinforcement. 
Bicchieri (2006) proposed a ‘rational reconstruction’ of what social norm is. In her 
definition, an agent will follow a norm when a ‘conditional preference’ is met. This 
preference consists of two types of expectation. One is called empirical expectation. This 
is an expectation where the agent believes that a sufficiently large people in the society will 
follow that norm. The second is called normative expectations. This is an expectation where 
the agent believes that a sufficiently large people in the society expect the agent to follow 
the norm. It is important to note that the “sufficiently large number” is a subjective 
condition, and can also be different between different norms and contexts. 
The term ‘emerge’ or ‘emergence’ is also an important element in the discussion about 
norms. Norms are considered emerged when it has been adopted by an adequate number 
of agents in the society. However, it is difficult to decide the threshold of how big this 
‘adequate number of agents’ is. In this study, instead of deciding a threshold and see 
whether norms have passed that or not, we will see if the moment of norm emergence is 
distinctively visible in the simulation process (i.e., as an abrupt change), or not. 
2.4 Simulation of Norm Emergence 
The mechanisms of norm emergence simulation are usually divided based on their phases 
in the norm life-cycle. They are creation, identification (also called ‘detection’ or 
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‘recognition’), spreading, and enforcement (Savarimuthu & Cranefield, 2011). Some recent 
researches can also be categorized into new categories such as norm internalization, norm 
assimilation, and norm removal (Mahmoud, Ahmad, Zaliman, Yusoff, & Mustapha, 2014).  
There are three mechanisms of norm creation. The first is offline design, where the agents 
are already equipped with some norms before the simulation starts (Hales, 2002; 
Savarimuthu, Cranefield, Purvis, & Purvis, 2010). This approach might not be realistic, 
since humans may not be equipped with a norm before they interact with each other. The 
second is by social power. In this mechanism, only some agents in the society are equipped 
with norms beforehand. They can enforce the norm to other agents in the society (Verhagen, 
2001). This better represents the reality, because in real life there are some institutions or 
authorities that decide rules and enforce people to follow them. However, as mentioned 
previously, many of societal phenomena are self-governed. This is represented by the third 
mechanism of norm creation: autonomous innovation. The simulations that use this 
mechanism focus on how agents generate their own idea that later can become the norm of 
the society. This approach is implemented by using off-line design of ideas combined by a 
filtering mechanism (Hollander & Wu, 2011). 
Norm detection is one of the main challenges in norms simulation (Mahmoud et al., 2014). 
Norm detection is the agents’ ability to discover the norm in the society. There are two 
major types of mechanism in norm detection. The first is learning, such as imitation 
(Epstein, 2001) and social learning (Sen & Airiau, 2007). This mechanism let the agents 
learn from their environment about the right thing to do. The social learning is usually 
implemented by using machine learning or game theory approaches (Savarimuthu & 
Cranefield, 2011).  
The second mechanism of norm detection is cognition. Such approach focuses on what 
happens inside the agent’s mind while deliberating about the norm (Andrighetto et al., 
2007; Mahmoud et al., 2014). 
Norm spreading deals with how a norm is distributed in the society. One area of focus is 
the relationship between agents, which reflects how the norm is passed from one agent to 
another (Chalub, Santos, & Pacheco, 2006). Another area is the network topology. They 
are categorized into static network topology and dynamic network topology (Savarimuthu 
& Cranefield, 2011).  
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Norm enforcement discusses how the society sanctions the agents in order to maintain the 
norm. It is implemented by either indirect sanctions (like reputation) (Hales, 2002) or direct 
sanctions (like material punishment or rewards) (Axelrod, 1986).  
As discussed in Section 1.1, the above mechanisms assume that there are superior agents 
in the society. The most basic form of superior agents is the agents that can punish or reward 
the other agents (e.g., Axelrod, 1986; Savarimuthu, Purvis, Purvis, & Cranefield, 2009). 
Such agents are equipped with a confidence that their action is the norm that should be 
enforced. There are other forms of superior agents. Boman (1999) used a central advisor 
role in the simulation. The agents need to consult this advisor agent before deciding an 
action. Hoffman (2003) used the term ‘norm entrepreneur’ to call the agents that pick a 
certain action then suggest it to other agents. Savarimuthu, et. al. (2008) used a slightly 
different approach. He adopts a different approach by giving all the agents initial different 
norms. However, in the interaction process some agents will be an advisor for others, thus 
more influential in the society’s norm emergence as a whole. In all of these situations, the 
interaction between agents becomes unequal. 
Sen and Airiau (2007) proposed mechanism that adopts a bottom-up emergence mechanism 
of norms. Their model focused on the agent’s social learning through experience. The 
society in their simulation need to create a norm of whether to drive on the left or on the 
right side of the road. By using machine learning algorithm, the agents try to learn the 
consequences of their actions and choose the safest action.  
In the terms of frameworks, there are several major frameworks used in norm simulation 
(Mahmoud et al., 2014).  
One of them is BOID Normative Architecture. BOID stands for Belief, Obligation, 
Intention, and Desire, proposed by Broersen, et. al. (2001). The basic mechanism of agents 
in this architecture is by generating goal sets after monitoring the environment. The agent’s 
deliberation process is modeled by modeling their desires, obligations, and intentions. The 
advantage of this framework is that it is able to model different personality such as simple 
minded, selfish, or social agents. 
Other framework is normative KGP agents. KGP stands for Knowledge, Goals, and Plans. 
Sadri, et.al. (2006) presented a framework that demonstrates how obligation and 
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prohibition can be used by an agent while it reasons, reacts, plans, and communicates in 
the context of an artificial society.  
Ahmad et.al. (2011) proposed another normative framework called OP-RND (Obligation-
Prohibition-Recommended-Neutrality-Disliked). Basically, those elements allow the 
agents to give reward or penalty to other agents. 
Besides norm framework, normative-agent-based system can also be distinguished by how 
it represents the norm. Hollander and Wu (2011) mentioned that there are four major 
representation schemes that have been used in representing norms in agent-based 
simulations.  
The first is the representation as deontic logic. Deontic logic is concerned with obligation, 
permission, and prohibition (Meyer & Wieringa, 1994; Von Wright, 1951). 
The second type of representation is the rule based systems. This is a set of condition – 
action pairs embedded inside the agents’ decision making procedure. This is usually used 
in the offline-design of norm creation (Castelfranchi, Conte, & Paolucci, 1998; Hales, 
2002; Saam & Harrer, 1999). 
The third is a representation by using binary strings. Digit ones represent the occurrence 
and digit zeros represent the absence of a norm. This format is often used in research on 
population to test the transmission and emergence of norms (Epstein, 2001; Nakamaru & 
Levin, 2004). 
Lastly, one common way to represent norms in an agent society is by using game-theory. 
In game-theory, every agent makes a simple choice of strategy that yields a corresponding 
payoff. Their goal is to maximize their payoff (Andrighetto et al., 2010; Savarimuthu et al., 
2009). 
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2.5 Position of The Current Study 
In this section, the summary of the model proposed in this study is presented. The key 
points are summarized in the following table. 
Table II-1. Position of the current study 
Elements State of The Art Current Study 
Definition of Norm Bicchieri’s definition (2006) Bicchieri’s definition (2006) 
Norm Simulation 
Architecture 
BOID, KGP, OP-RND, etc. Mutual Belief Model 
Representation of 
Norm  
Deontic logic, game theory, etc. 
Intention and expectation (agent-
level) 
Convergence of actions (society 
level) 
Cognitive Structure 
EMIL (Norm Internalization 
model), series of rules in norm 
identification 
Mutual belief and mental 
subgrouping (a generic cognition 
model) 
Emergence Mechanism 
Top-down emergence, bottom-up 
emergence with superior agents, 
or bottom-up emergence with 
limited norm candidates 
Bottom-up emergence, with no 
superior agent, with multiple norm 
candidates 
Motivation to conform 
Avoid punishment, getting 
reward, or norm internalization 
(EMIL) 
Trade-off between utilitarian 
motive and conformity with the 
majority 
 
2.5.1 Representation of norms 
There are several key novelties in the current norm emergence modeling compared to the 
existing ones. First, in the terms of norm representation. In Section 2.4, four different types 
of norm representation have been explained, i.e., deontic logic, rule based systems, binary 
strings, and game theory. In the current study, in the agent-level, norm is represented by the 
combination of intention, empirical expectation, and normative expectation. This satisfies 
Bicchieri’s definition of norms (Cristina Bicchieri, 2006). In the societal level, norm is 
represented as the convergence of the agent’s actions. This representation allows to view 
norms from the subjective perspective rather than objective perspective. Different people 
in the same society can have different view about what the norm is. The emergence of 
norms is indicated by the convergence of the agents’ actions, not by whether a threshold of 
the number of people that follow a norm has been passed or not. 
2.5.2 Structure of cognition model 
The second novelty is related to the model of the agents’ cognition. In several different 
researches, norm emergence has been modeled by also taking into account the cognitive 
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model of the agents. Andrighetto, et.al. (2010) introduced a cognitive model of norm 
emergence named EMIL (Emergence in The Loop). In this model he emphasized the norm 
internalization process. Savarimuthu,et.al. (2010) also introduced a cognitive model of 
norm. Their model focuses on norm identification. They represent norm identification by 
using a series of rules. 
The model proposed in the current study differs with those two cognitive models in two 
ways. The first is that our model provides a reductivist point view. In this point of view, 
cognition of the society can be reduced into individual cognition and a relation between 
them. This is reached by providing a clear separation between the individual intention, the 
partners’ intention, and the beliefs about partners’ intention. In other cognitive model, such 
separation cannot be made.  
The second difference is that our model is a generic cognition model. Our model provides 
a generic structure of human cognition when interact with other people. This model can be 
applied to other cognitive phenomena other than norm emergence. In previous researches, 
the same model has been used for analyzing team interaction (Kanno, Furuta, & Kitahara, 
2013; Mahardhika et al., 2016) and to analyze perception gap (Kanno, Furuta, & Chou, 
2013). Due to its generic characteristics, expanding the current model by adding other 
factor such as emotion can be done easily within the same three-layer structure. Besides, 
by using one same model to analyze different phenomena, it will be easier to see the 
correlation between those phenomena. The other cognitive models mentioned above are 
specifically designed to analyze norm emergence. Therefore, it will more difficult to see 
the correlation with other cognitive phenomena. 
2.5.3 Mental subgrouping process 
Mental subgrouping process is an inherent process in human’s mind (Mahardhika et al., 
2016). Due to limited cognitive ability, human cannot comprehend cognitive status 
(opinion, expectation, and so on) of many people at once. The emergence of norm involves 
interaction with many other people at once. Besides, due to the nature of the society, where 
there are so many members and it is impossible to interact with all members, mental 
subgrouping always happen in the process of norm emergence. To represent the real 
condition, this mental subgrouping process needs to be incorporated in the model of norm 
emergence. The model proposed in the current study uses mental subgrouping process as 
one of its important process in comprehending the cognitive status of other agents. 
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2.5.4 Bottom-up emergence 
The term ‘emergence’ has been used in many norm simulations. The emergence of a norm 
is usually defined as the moment when the particular norm has been adopted by a certain 
number of people in the society (Hollander & Wu, 2011). Even though the word 
‘emergence’ itself has the nuance of ‘bottom-up mechanism’, the term ‘norm emergence’ 
does not necessarily imply a bottom-up emergence as mentioned in Section 1.2.1.  
In the conventional use of the term ‘norm emergence’, the norm is already embedded in 
the superior agent(s), and later spreaded and adopted by the society. In this sense, such 
emergence is using a top-down mechanism. In the review of norm simulation researches 
by Savarimuthu and Cranefiled (2011), there are only two researches that adopts bottom-
up emergence. One is by Hoffmann (2003). He called the mechanism “entrepreneurship 
mechanism of norm emergence”. Every agent in the society ‘picks’ an action (represented 
by a value from 0-100). Some agents that have a closer value to the average of the society 
will be able to punish other agents. In the research by Verhagen (2001), all agents have 
different actions and those actions have the same possibility to be the norm of the society. 
The agents consult and influence with each other to choose the norm. However, in his 
research, there are ‘leader agents’ whose influence is 10 times higher than other agents. 
Therefore, those two researches did not the isolate the bottom-up emergence from the effect 
of leader / superior agents. In the current study, norm emergence is modeled by using 
bottom-up mechanism without any superior agents. 
In Sen and Airiau’s research (2007), bottom-up emergence was also used. There was no 
superior agent in the interaction process among the agents. However, the choices of action 
have been limited since the very beginning. In their research, the society needs to decide 
whether to drive on the left side or on the right side of the road. In our opinion, a true 
bottom-up emergence should allow as many possible actions as there are agents. In the 
current study, since the beginning the agents are allowed to have a choice of action specific 
to their own.  
2.5.5 Motivation to conform with the norm 
In other studies, motivation to conform with the norm are limited to sanction, like 
punishment and reward (Axelrod, 1986; Flentge, Polani, & Uthmann, 2001; López, Luck, 
& d’Inverno, 2002) or reputation (Castelfranchi et al., 1998; Hales, 2002). A novel 
29 
approach was done by using the internalization as the motivation (Andrighetto et al., 2010). 
In their research, an agent will conform with a norm only when they have internalized the 
norm. In the current study, a new approach is proposed. The motivation of the agent’s action 
is represented by a trade-off between utilitarian motive, and a motive to conform with the 
majority. This motivation is explained further in Section 3.3. 
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Chapter III 
APPROACH AND METHOD 
3.1 Model of Society 
According to Bicchieri’s definition, a norm is a specific behavioral rule in a given specific 
situation or context (Cristina Bicchieri, 2006). In this section, the situation or context of 
the norm being modeled in this study will be discussed.  
In representing the deliberation process about agent’s intention and expectations, a model 
that contains conflict among them is needed. Besides, the model should also be able to let 
every agent has his/her own choice of action, not limited to just a few options. In principle, 
the maximum number of possible actions (thus possible norm) is the number of agents in 
that society.  
In this study, The Tragedy of the Commons (TOC) is used as the problem to be solved by 
a society of agents (Hardin, 2009). There are a certain number of agents in the society, 
occupying a certain size of land. Each of them tries to acquire land, with the ultimate goal 
to gain profit from the land they acquire. The problem that needs to be solved in the TOC 
game is about how to distribute the resources to maximize the profit of all inhabitants, 
while avoiding resource quality depletion due to overconsumption. The agents’ decision 
(the land size that they want to acquire in an iteration) is the function of their own profit 
calculation (intention), and also the intention of other agents. 
Unlike other popular game theory used for simulating norm such as Prisoner’s Dilemma, 
TOC offers many possible actions, not just a few (such as cooperate or defect). A single 
type of action in TOC is represented by a single value of the acquired land. If there are five 
agents acquiring different land sizes, it is said that there are five possible actions that has 
the possibility to become the norm in the society. This can better reflect the real world 
situation where people can have many alternatives in deciding their action. The norm that 
is expected to emerge in the end is a subset of those actions.  
The agents in this society are connected to each other using an observation network. Each 
agent is connected to a certain number of partners (less than the size of the population) in 
a unidirectional way. It means that if Agent A can observe Agent B, it does not necessarily 
mean that B can also observe A. 
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3.2 Model of Agents 
The starting point of the norm emergence is the individual actions. To avoid confusion 
between this individual actions and the actions based on norms, the discussion about 
‘action before norm emerges’ is referred to as intention of the action. Individual agent can 
have independent intention and after affected by the norm emergence, the actual action can 
be different from the intention. In real life, we can see this phenomenon in many situations. 
For example, when we see a dying person on a busy street, we may have the intention to 
help him or her. However, after watching that nobody helps him or her, we might think that 
not helping this person is the right thing to do, so finally our action is to ignore that person. 
This example is called ‘pluralistic ignorance’ or ‘bystander effect’ (Darley & Latane, 1968).  
Another important element in norm emergence is how the agents deliberate about their own 
action and their partners’ actions. As mentioned previously, according to Bicchieri (2006) 
there are two types of expectation that need to be fulfilled in order that a person will 
recognize that a norm exists. The first is empirical expectation which says that there should 
be a large number of people who conform to that norm. The second is normative 
expectation which says that there should be a large number of people that expect the person 
to conform to that norm. 
By comparing the intention, empirical expectation, and normative expectation, agent will 
then decide the action that they will take. This process is modeled by using the mutual 
belief model. 
The ultimate goal of every agent is to increase his/her land size to get maximum profit. It 
is also assumed that every agent will always conform to a norm if he/she perceives that a 
possible norm exists. This assumption is based on Cialdini and Goldstein’s argument that 
human has an inherent tendency to conform with others (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004).  
Agents also know that the land is limited, and when reaching the limit, the quality of the 
land will decrease. The decrease of the land quality will reduce the profit that the agents 
get. However, they do not know the total occupancy of the land.  
In the simulation, agents update their intentions (1st layer) and beliefs (2nd and 3rd layers) 
by making a profit calculation and interaction with each other, respectively. The process is 
explained as follows: 
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3.2.1 The update of the 1st layer 
To decide the intention, agents need to calculate their profit. The profit Pi,t of an agent i at 
time t is calculated using Equation III-1. ai,t is land size acquired by the agent i at time t. 
Wt is the profit factor at time t.  
𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖,𝑡 .𝑊𝑡 
Equation III-1. Agent's profit 
 
Profit factor is determined by the land occupancy. When reaching full occupancy, the land 
quality will gradually decrease, which is given by Equation III-2. atotal in this equation is 
the total land available in the society.  
𝑊𝑡 = 
{
 
 
 
 1              𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 (
∑ 𝑎𝑖,𝑡𝑖
𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
)  ≤ 80%
5 − 5(
∑ 𝑎𝑖,𝑡𝑖
𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
) 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
Equation III-2. Profit factor 
(as published in Mahardhika, et.al. (2017)) 
 
      
When planning for the next iteration, agents will consider a ratio called Ri,t , which is the 
ratio between the current profit Pi,t  and the maximum profit Pi,max that the agent has 
gained since the first iteration (from t=0 up to the current t)  
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝑃𝑖,𝑚𝑎𝑥
 
Equation III-3. Profit ratio 
   
Agent’s intention is implemented as the land size that the agent wants to acquire, labeled 
as PA. It is calculated by Equation III-4. The variable gi is the default land increment of 
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agent i, which indicates the personality of the agent whether it is greedy (gi =3), balanced 
(gi =2) or modest (gi =1). 
𝑃𝐴𝑖,𝑡+1 = {
𝑎𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑔𝑖 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 ≥ 1
𝑎𝑖,𝑡 + ‖𝑅𝑖,𝑡 ∙ (𝑔𝑖 − 1)‖ 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤i𝑠𝑒
 
Equation III-4. Agent's intention 
(as published in Mahardhika, et. al. (2017)) 
 
L1i,t is the status of the first layer of agent i at time t. The value is equal to PAi,t+1. The 
assumption behind the above equation is as follows. Since all agents want to gain more 
profit, as long as their profit is bigger than or equal to their previous maximum profit, they 
will keep adding land. When adding the land results in a lower profit than their previous 
maximum one, they will suspect that the land almost reaches full occupancy. Therefore, 
they will slow down their land acquisition. Since the size of the land represents one discrete 
action (and a discrete norm candidate) PA is always rounded to the nearest integer.   
3.2.2 The update of the 2nd layer 
The 2nd layer (L2i,t) of an agent is updated by asking about the 1st layer of the agent’s 
partners. L2i,t contains a set of pair-values (x,y) consisting land-size plans intended by the 
partners, where x is a land size value, and y is the number of partners that are planning to 
acquire x unit of land. Since some other agent will ask about the status of agent i’s L2, it is 
also necessary to provide a single value representing set L2i,t . L2aggi,t is the aggregate of 
the values in L2i,t . The aggregation method will be explained in Section 3.4.   
3.2.3 The update of the 3rd layer 
Next, to update the value of the third layer, similarly agent i will ask about the partners’ 
second layer L2aggj,t , where j are the index of the partners. The value will be stored in L3i,t, 
which also contains pair values of x and y, similar to L2.  
In real life, even though we can observe other people’s behavior, understanding other 
people’s intention is not always possible. To represent such situation, in the simulation a 
certain portion of communication attempts (both in asking partner’s L1 and L2) are 
designed to fail. When it fails, it means that when an agent asks about another agent’s 
intention or expectation, the agent will not receive an answer. In such situation, the asker 
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will infer the answer from the last known norm which is calculated by aggregating land 
size off all observable agents in the previous iteration. The aggregation method will be 
explained in Section 3.4. 
3.2.4 Finding norm candidates 
After updating the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd layer, agents will try to find the candidates of the norm. 
One important notion in this process is norm threshold value. In her definition, Bicchieri 
(Cristina Bicchieri, 2006) mentioned that for each expectation to be fulfilled, there should 
be large number of people that fulfilled it. The threshold number that defines the ‘large 
number of people’ is very subjective, and can be different between different norms. 
In this simulation, every agent is equipped with different threshold values. Let NTi be the 
norm threshold value of agent i. Each value of x in L2 and L3 will be a norm candidate for 
that agent, when both of the following conditions are met:  
 The corresponding y value is larger or equal to NTi 
 The value x exists both in L2 and L3 
Let Ci,t be the set of norm candidate values, thus:  
 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = {𝑥 | (𝑥, 𝑦)  ∈  𝐿2𝑖,𝑡  ∧  (𝑥, 𝑦)  ∈  𝐿3𝑖,𝑡  ∧  𝑦 ≥  𝑁𝑇𝑖} 
Equation III-5. Norm candidate set 
(as published in Mahardhika, et. al. (2017)) 
 
The values inside this set will be refined further using different strategies. This will be 
mentioned in Section 3.4. Finally, using the set Ci,t and also the value of L1i,t agent i will 
decide ai,t+1, by using the following rule. If Ci,t is empty, ai,t+1 = L1i,t. Otherwise, it will 
choose a value from Ci,t that is the closest to L1i,t, either larger or smaller. The flow of the 
agents’ decision making is shown in Figure III-1. 
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Figure III-1. Agent’s decision making process 
(as published in Mahardhika, et. al. (2017)) 
 
In the simulation, a norm is represented not as a single metric, but as the agents’ perception 
towards it. In the above formulation, for an agent i, any element of Ci,t is a possible norm. 
Norm and individual action are influencing each other continuously until they reach a stable 
condition, as shown in Figure III-2. The perceived norm will influence individual action, 
and individual action will influence other agent’s perceived norm, which in turn will affect 
the agent’s perceived norm in the next iteration, and so on.  
 
 
Figure III-2. Feedback loop of norm emergence 
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3.3 Model of Norm 
As explained in Section 2.3, norms can be viewed from two perspectives. The first is from 
the objective perspective. This is the perspective used by most of the research about norm 
simulation. For example, in Savarimuthu, Purvis, Purvis, and Cranefield (2009), the norm 
is ‘not to litter’. There are two categories of agents: those who obey the norm (do not litter) 
and those who does not obey (do litter). There is only one norm in the society and it is the 
same for all agents. This modeling fails to explain that different agent might have different 
understanding of ‘what the norm is’, not just whether they obey a norm or not. Two agents 
might think that they are obeying a norm, but their action can still be different if they have 
different perception of the norm.  
In this research, norm is viewed from the perspective of each agent’s mind. This is called 
the subjective perspective. In the end of the simulation, the emergence of the norm is not 
necessarily a uniform action among the agents. When agents think that they are following 
a norm but the perceived norms are different, the final action may be different. 
Using such a perspective, emergence of norms is not modeled based on the number of 
agents that follow a certain norm, but based on the convergence of the agents’ actions. 
Higher convergence of agents’ action indicates that the agents have a similar perception of 
what the norm in the society is.  
Another important feature of norm model in this research is that the agents are not always 
sure about the perceived norm. As explained in the previous section, before deciding the 
action agents will compare its own intention with the content of norm candidates set. The 
number of values in the set is usually larger than one. This represents the uncertainty that 
the agent face when deciding which one is the norm.  
The agent then will choose one value from the set that is closest to its own intention. This 
feature represents the agents’ effort to conform with the society, but at the same time want 
to follow his own intention. This trade-off tendency conforms with Bicchieri’s (2010) 
argument that norm should be a mixed motive game. This means that there are utilitarian 
motive (maximizing his own profit) and also the motive to conform with others. 
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3.4 Variation of Mental Subgrouping Strategy 
In the decision making process (as shown in Figure III-1), there are several steps where the 
agents are required to consider information about or from their partners. As mentioned 
previously, it is assumed that agents cannot consider the action of all members of society, 
but instead, only a portion of it. Besides, when observing the observable partners, they need 
to aggregate the information into one value. Therefore, mental subgrouping strategy is 
needed.  
There are three steps where the agents need to do mental subgrouping, as shown in Table 
III-1. 
In the step marked as MSG-A in Figure III-1, the agents observes the actual action of their 
partners. They need to aggregate those values into a single value, which is used to infer the 
status of a layer when a communication fails. Let Pi be the set of partners that agent i can 
observe and interact with. In the beginning of each iteration, each agent i will observe the 
actual land size acquired by their partner j at time t-1 (denoted as aj,t-1) for all j ∈ Pi. Let k 
be the size of set Pi. There are three strategies to be simulated, and also one condition where 
all communications will be successful. The aggregated value is called ‘last known norm’ 
and denoted as Mi,t-1. 
 
Table III-1. Mental subgrouping strategies 
(as published in Mahardhika, et. al. (2017)) 
Step No. of Sub-group Strategies 
(MSG-A) Aggregating 
observed action (used to infer 
unresponded query about 
partners’ L1 / L2) 
1  Averaging (AVG) 
 Most common action (MCOM) 
 Random (RND) 
 Perfect communication 
(MSG-B) Aggregating 
information about partners’ 
intention  
(own L2) 
 
1  Averaging (AVG) 
 Most common action (MCOM) 
 Random (RND) 
(MSG-C) Finding norm 
candidates 
Several  Threshold (THRES) 
 3 most common actions (MAJ3) 
 3 quartiles (QUART) 
 3 random actions (RND) 
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In the ‘Averaging’ (AVG) strategy of MSG-A, the agent collects the value of partners’ 
decision (their land size) and calculate the arithmetic mean and round it to the nearest 
integer, as shown in Equation III-6. 
 
𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1 = ‖
∑ 𝑎𝑗,𝑡−1𝑗∈𝑃𝑖
𝑘
‖ 
Equation III-6. AVG strategy for MSG-A 
 
In the ‘Most common action’ (MCOM), the agent finds the most common value chosen by 
its partners (value with highest frequency). When the most common values are more than 
one (multiple values with a same frequency), the value is chosen randomly from those 
values. In ‘Random’ (RND), the value is chosen randomly from all values chosen by the 
partners.  
As an example, let us assume that a particular agent i has 10 partners, and the value of land 
acquired by those partners in the previous iteration are as follows: 
 
Table III-2. Example of partners' land size in the previous iteration 
Partner 
no. (j) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Value 
(aj,t-1) 
4 2 6 7 9 4 9 11 7 11 
 
In the AVG strategy, the Mi,t-1 for the above example will be 7. For the MCOM strategy, 
since there are 4 values with the highest frequency of 2, then the Mi,t-1 will be randomly 
picked among those values (4, 7, 9, 11). For the RND strategy, Mi,t-1 will be randomly 
picked among all values (2, 4, 4, 6, 7, 7, 9, 9, 11, 11). 
The ‘PERFECT’ case is not a strategy. In the simulations with this case, communication is 
assumed to be always successful so the agents do not need to make any inference. 
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When other agents make a query about an agent’s L2, the agent need to provide a single 
value instead of passing all the information it has about its partners’ L1, denoted by L2aggi,t. 
Therefore, it needs to perform another mental subgrouping (MSG-B). The strategies are 
averaging (AVG), using most common action (MCOM), and choosing random value from 
existing values (RND). The explanation of the strategies is similar with ones in MSG-A. 
Let Pi be the set of partners that agent i can observe and interact with, and  j ∈ Pi. Let k be 
the size of set Pi . For the AVG strategy, it follows Equation III-7.  
𝐿2𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑖,𝑡 = ‖
∑ 𝐿1𝑗𝑗∈𝑃𝑖
𝑘
‖ 
Equation III-7. AVG strategy for MSG-B 
 
As an example, let us assume that a particular agent i has 10 partners, and the intention 
(L1) of its partners are as follows: 
Table III-3. Example of partner's intention (partners’ L1) 
Partner 
no. (j) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Value 
(L1j,t) 
5 3 9 9 12 6 10 11 8 14 
 
In the AVG strategy, the L2aggi,t for the above example is 9. For the MCOM strategy, the 
value is 9 since it has the highest frequency of 2. For the RND strategy, L2aggi,t is randomly 
picked among all values (3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14). 
As mentioned previously, agents use a threshold to decide the norm candidate (MSG-C). 
Besides the threshold, agents can also add several other strategies to reduce the number of 
the norm candidates. They can choose three most common values (MAJ3), the three 
quartiles of the candidate values (QUART), or three random values from the candidate 
values (RAND3). In ‘Threshold’ (THRES), the agents do not add any additional strategy 
to refine the norm candidates. In the MAJ3 strategy, after using the THRES strategy, the 
agents pick the three most common values from the candidate set. If there are multiple 
values with the same frequency, all of them will be chosen.  
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In the QUART strategy, after using the THRES strategy, the agents put the values in 
sequence, and choose the 25%, 50%, and 75% quartile values from them. In the RAND3 
strategy, the agents choose three random values after using the THRES strategy. 
As an example, let us assume that a particular agent i has 30 partners, and it has a norm 
threshold of 3. Table III-4 shows the content of i’s L2 (collection of i’s partners’ L1), and 
Table III-5 shows the content of i’s L3 (collection of i’s partners’ L2agg). In both table, the 
first row shows the value (in land unit), the second row shows the respective frequency of 
those values. The total of the frequency is 30, equal to the number of partners. The columns 
that are shadowed are those with the frequency of less than or equal to the threshold. 
Table III-4. Example of the content of L2 
Value 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Frequency 4 6 2 4 7 6 1 
 
Table III-5. Example of the content of L3 
Value 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Frequency 4 6 6 4 4 3 3 
 
Agent i decides the norm candidate set by looking at the content of L2 and L3. The values 
that exceed the threshold in both layers will be the element of Ci,t. In the above example, 
Ci,t = {5,6,8,9}.  In the THRES strategy, this candidate will be used as it is.  
In MAJ3 strategy, this set will be refined further by taking only 3 most common values. 
The frequencies of those values are calculated by rounding the average frequency of each 
values in both layers. Therefore, for the above set (Ci,t = {5,6,8,9}), the frequencies are 4, 
6, 4, and 6 respectively. There are only 2 frequencies here (4 and 6) so for the AVG strategy, 
the set will still be Ci,t = {5,6,8,9}. 
For the QUART strategy, it is necessary to put all the values in order as shown below, in 
which each values are repeated according to the new frequency calculated above:  
5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 8 8 8 8 9 9 9 9 9 9 
The first quartile is 6. The second quartile (median) is 8, The third quartile is 9. Therefore, 
for the QUART strategy Ci,t = {6,8,9} 
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In the RAND3 strategy, 3 values will randomly be picked from the set from THRES 
strategy Ci,t = {5,6,8,9}, for example Ci,t = {5,6,9}.  
The strategies mentioned in MSG-A, MSG-B, or MSG-C are by no means exhaustive. It is 
unknown how mental subgrouping is done in a person’s mind. However, it is suspected 
that mental subgrouping is influenced by perceived similarity of one’s partners, either in 
intention, characteristics, ideas, and so on. In this research, the agents’ cognition is 
represented by their intention and expectation. Thus, similarity in them among one’s 
partners is suspected to be the trigger of mental subgrouping. To represent this, average and 
majority rules are used. Another possibility is by centrality or distribution of the intention, 
characteristics, ideas, and so on. This is represented by using the three quartiles as mental 
subgroups. Random rules are chosen to accommodate the possibility that sometimes mental 
subgrouping is randomly done. 
In the simulation, the combination of those strategies are compared and the effect on the 
overall actions of the agents is examined. In total there are 48 combination of strategies in 
MSG-A, MSG-B, and MSG-C. In one simulation, all agents will decide using one same 
combination.  
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Chapter IV 
SIMULATION 
4.1 Initial Setup 
The first step in doing the simulation is to generate the population. A population with 200 
agents was generated. The number is chosen in such a way that will give insights about the 
emergence but only requires a reasonable computation time. 
The three characteristics (greedy, balanced, and modest, with the ratio of 3:3:4), and also 
the initial land size (uniformly distributed, from 1-40) were assigned randomly to the agents. 
For each agent, a norm threshold is also decided, uniformly distributed from 3-8.  
A unidirectional interaction network was generated. For each agent, 50 other agents are 
randomly connected to form the network. This network is fixed throughout the simulation. 
To represent the limited resources in the TOC game, the size of the land is 20,000 units. 
The number of iterations is 800 iterations. 
The complete list of the strategy combination is shown on Table IV-1. 
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Table IV-1. Strategy combinations 
ID MSG-A MSG-B MSG-C ID MSG-A MSG-B MSG-C 
1 AVG AVG THRES 25 RND AVG THRES 
2 AVG AVG MAJ3 26 RND AVG MAJ3 
3 AVG AVG QUART 27 RND AVG QUART 
4 AVG AVG RAND3 28 RND AVG RAND3 
5 AVG MCOM THRES 29 RND MCOM THRES 
6 AVG MCOM MAJ3 30 RND MCOM MAJ3 
7 AVG MCOM QUART 31 RND MCOM QUART 
8 AVG MCOM RAND3 32 RND MCOM RAND3 
9 AVG RND THRES 33 RND RND THRES 
10 AVG RND MAJ3 34 RND RND MAJ3 
11 AVG RND QUART 35 RND RND QUART 
12 AVG RND RAND3 36 RND RND RAND3 
13 MCOM AVG THRES 37 PERFECT AVG THRES 
14 MCOM AVG MAJ3 38 PERFECT AVG MAJ3 
15 MCOM AVG QUART 39 PERFECT AVG QUART 
16 MCOM AVG RAND3 40 PERFECT AVG RAND3 
17 MCOM MCOM THRES 41 PERFECT MCOM THRES 
18 MCOM MCOM MAJ3 42 PERFECT MCOM MAJ3 
19 MCOM MCOM QUART 43 PERFECT MCOM QUART 
20 MCOM MCOM RAND3 44 PERFECT MCOM RAND3 
21 MCOM RND THRES 45 PERFECT RND THRES 
22 MCOM RND MAJ3 46 PERFECT RND MAJ3 
23 MCOM RND QUART 47 PERFECT RND QUART 
24 MCOM RND RAND3 48 PERFECT RND RAND3 
 
4.2 Result and Discussion 
There are two expected effects that represents norm emergence. The first is the convergence 
of the agents’ decision. The second is the growth of agents’ decision over time. They are 
quantitatively represented by standard deviation of decision (land size), and average of 
agent’s profit, respectively. The values calculated at the 800th iteration are used. Figure 
IV-1 shows the general overview of all the 48 strategy combinations in the default (initial 
setup) scenario. Different colors represent each strategy of MSG-C. 
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4.2.1 General overview 
 
Figure IV-1. Norm emergence at the 800th iteration (MSG-C) 
A good norm emergence is indicated by low standard deviation (x-axis) and high average 
profit (y-axis). Almost all strategies have higher average profit and lower standard 
deviation than the situation where the second and third layer is not used (marked by black 
star / NOMBM in Figure IV-1).  
This simulation was done two times. In general, the norms in the 800th iteration fall only 
around 20-50 units of land per agent, with the final average of 33.97 (in the first trial) and 
33.22 (in the second trial). This is higher than the initial average of the agents’ initial land 
size which is 20 units of land per agent.  
In the NOMBM case, agents do not take into account other agents’ intention or action. 
When reaching the full capacity of the land, all agents decrease the rate of land acquisition, 
following Equation III-4. However, this individual effort is too slow, thus when they totally 
stop, the profit factor of the land is already very low. The high standard deviation is caused 
by the big gap between the acquisition rate of modest agents and greedy agents. 
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Figure IV-2. Agents' profit in the base case 
 
Figure IV-2 shows the condition of NOMBM case. Each line in the figure represents the 
land acquired by each agent. The x-axis shows the iteration number. The y-axis is the land 
size obtained by each agent. In the beginning of the simulation, all agents increase their 
lands based on their characteristics. After reaching a certain point, some agents started to 
reach a plateau, but some other agents just slow down their acquisition rate. After around 
the 50th iteration the agents do not add more land. Since every agent in the end chooses 
different action, it can be said that there is no norm emerges in such society. The greedy 
agents are the latest to stop adding their land size due to their characteristics. This causes 
the overconsumption of the land and thus reduces its quality. In the end, the profit of all 
agents become very low (the black star in Figure IV-1). 
Among the 48 strategy combinations, the result of three strategies are shown in Figure IV-4, 
Figure IV-5, and Figure IV-6. The scale on y-axis is the same with the one in Figure IV-2 
(base case). These strategies were chosen to show different extreme cases. The average 
profit and convergence of these three strategies are shown in the red circles in Figure IV-3. 
The first, second, and third strategy are shown in the top-left (PERFECT-RND-QUART), 
47 
top-right (MCOM-RND-THRES), and bottom-right (PERFECT-MCOM-THRES) circle 
respectively. 
 
Figure IV-3. Extreme cases 
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Figure IV-4 shows the result of PERFECT-RND-QUART strategy. In this situation, the 
decisions of the agents converge in the early stage of the simulation. After that, the decision 
increases slowly until the end of the simulation. The average profit in the end of the 
simulation is 50.39. This value is the highest among the 48 combinations.  
 
Figure IV-4. PERFECT-RND-QUART strategy 
  
When agents consider each other intentions and expectations, they can reach a convergence 
of action while at the same time reach a high profit. This is caused by the decision making 
process. When an agent recognizes its partners’ intention, it will cause the agent to adjust 
his decision to match with the society. All agents do the same process; thus it creates a loop 
that allow the whole society to indirectly coordinate their action. 
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Figure IV-5 shows the result of MCOM-RND-THRES strategy. In this situation, a small 
group of agents manage to coordinate with each other to increase their land size together. 
However, most of other agents stop increasing their land. Upon further investigation, it is 
found that the agents stop increasing their land size because their partners also do the same, 
not because they realize that the profit is decreasing. Overall, the high variation of agents’ 
decision, and also the behavior of some agents that keep increasing the land create a low 
convergence. However, on average the profit is still high in the final iteration, which is 
48.09. 
 
Figure IV-5. MCOM-RND-THRES strategy 
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Figure IV-6 shows the result of PERFECT-MCOM-THRES strategy. This case shows very 
low convergence in the agents’ decision. Compared to the previous strategy, visually this 
one seems to have less variation. However, due to a very large gap between agents with 
large land and agents with small land, overall the convergence becomes very low. Besides, 
since the agents with large land were late to stop increasing the land size, the land became 
overconsumed. This situation creates a low land quality in the end of the simulation. The 
average final profit is 16.33. 
 
Figure IV-6. PERFECT-MCOM-THRES strategy 
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Figure IV-7 shows the average profit of the base case and the three cases mentioned above. 
As shown in the figure, the base case and PERFECT-MCOM-THRES strategy quickly 
reach a high profit average but later drop suddenly. The peak of profit happens due to the 
decreasing land profit factor once the total land occupancy reaches 80%. 
 
Figure IV-7. Average profit of the extreme cases 
The result of all the 48 strategies in the default scenario is shown in Appendix A. Table 
IV-2 shows the summary of all simulations done in this study 
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Table IV-2. Summary of all simulations 
Scenarios 
Number of 
partners 
per agent 
Type of 
network 
Population 
composition 
(greedy : 
balanced : 
modest) 
Strategy 
variation 
Number of 
trials 
Default case 50 
Random, 
unidirectional 
3:3:4 
48 
strategies 
2 
Different no. 
of MSG 
50 
Random, 
unidirectional 
3:3:4 
8 
strategies 
2 
Small 
number of 
partners 
10 
Random, 
unidirectional 
3:3:4 
48 
strategies 
2 
Large 
number of 
partners 
150 
Random, 
unidirectional 
3:3:4 
48 
strategies 
2 
L3 switched 
off 
50 
Random, 
unidirectional 
3:3:4 
48 
strategies 
2 
Greedy 
dominant 
society 
50 
Random, 
unidirectional 
8:1:1 
48 
strategies 
1 
Modest 
dominant 
society 
50 
Random, 
unidirectional 
1:1:8 
48 
strategies 
1 
Greedy 
dominant 
society, L3 
switched off 
50 
Random, 
unidirectional 
8:1:1 
48 
strategies 
1 
Modest 
dominant 
society, L3 
switched off 
50 
Random, 
unidirectional 
1:1:8 
48 
strategies 
1 
Small-world 
network 
Varied, with 
the average 
of 30 
Watts-Strogatz 
Model, 
bidirectional 
1:1:1 
48 
strategies 
1 
Random 
network 
Varied, with 
the average 
of 30 
Erdos-Renyi 
Model, 
bidirectional 
1:1:1 
48 
strategies 
1 
Scale-free 
network 
Varied, with 
the average 
of 30 
Barabasi-
Albert Model, 
bidirectional 
1:1:1 
48 
strategies 
1 
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4.2.2 Sudden convergence 
One important aspect in analyzing norm emergence is to see whether norm emerge 
suddenly in a society or through a slow but steady process. To do this, the standard 
deviation of agents’ decision in all iteration for each strategy is plotted into a graph. Then, 
the graph is checked whether it has a sudden decrease or not. A sudden decrease is defined 
as a 2-unit or larger decrease of standard deviation in less than 10 iterations. One example 
of strategy with sudden decrease and one without it are shown in Figure IV-8 and Figure 
IV-10 respectively. Figure IV-8 is the result of AVG-RND-QUART strategy. The respective 
raw result is shown in Figure IV-9. Figure IV-10 is the result of RND-AVG-MAJ3 strategy. 
The respective raw result is shown in Figure IV-11. 
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Figure IV-8. A sample case with sudden decrease 
 
 
Figure IV-9. Norm Emergence of AVG-RND-QUART strategy 
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Figure IV-10. A sample case without a sudden decrease 
 
 
Figure IV-11. Norm emergence of RND-AVG-MAJ3 strategy 
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It turns out that only 5 out of 48 strategies show no sudden decrease. The list of these 
strategies are: 
 RND-AVG-THRES 
 RND-AVG-MAJ3 
 RND-MCOM-MAJ3 
 RND-RND-MAJ3 
 RND-RND-QUART 
The convergence of decision happens suddenly in most of the cases. This phenomenon is 
similar with the tipping concept (Schelling, 1960). The tipping concept says that when a 
norm shift happens, the transition tends to be sudden rather than incremental. Once a crucial 
threshold is crossed and a sufficient number of people made the changes, positive feedback 
reinforces the situation. 
Similarly, in our simulation the agents shift to converged actions after there are sufficient 
number of people doing same action in the society. In all of the cases where a sudden 
decrease happens, it happens before the 60th iteration. This is a relatively early compared 
to the whole simulation steps. In the beginning when every agent’s decision is different, 
they start to find out what is the norm in the society and decide based on what they find so 
far. After some iterations, there is a moment where the number of agents doing one same 
action reaches the norm threshold of most agents. This is perceived as norm, thus followed 
by the agents. After this major convergence, the agents will make more adjustment to try 
to conform with each other. In some cases (like in PERFECT-RND-QUART strategy, 
Figure IV-4), the agents then increase their land size together in a similar rate.     
The other 5 strategies where there is no sudden decrease, all of them have the same mental 
subgrouping strategy for MSG-A, which is RND (random guess for inference when 
communication fails). It implies that accuracy in perceiving other agent’s intention plays a 
significant role in reaching convergence in the society. If the agents do not carefully infer 
the intention of its partners, but instead pick a random value to update his second layer, it 
will be more difficult for the society to reach convergence. Careful inference in this 
simulation is done by either calculate the average value from previous actions, or by finding 
the most common actions (as explained in Table III-1, MSG-A). 
57 
4.2.3 Number of norm candidates 
The strategies marked in red in Figure IV-1 are those that only use the threshold strategy 
for MSG-C without additional subgrouping. Most of them do not converge and have low 
average profit. The possible cause is the number of norm candidates that each agent has 
while making decision. In these strategies, the number of candidates in an iteration for an 
agent can reach up to 15 candidates. In other strategies, the maximum number is only three. 
To see the correlation between the number of norm candidates and norm emergence, other 
simulations have been conducted. Simulations are conducted using the best strategy from 
the previous simulation that used MAJ3 strategy (the top-left blue dot in Figure IV-1, AVG-
RND-MAJ3), with various number of norm candidates for MSG-C (1,3,5,7,9,11,13,15 
most common values, respectively). The simulation was done twice, and the results are 
shown in Figure IV-12 and Figure IV-16. The raw result of 1,3, 15 common values for trials 
1 and 2 are shown in Figure IV-13, Figure IV-14, Figure IV-15, Figure IV-17, Figure IV-18, 
Figure IV-19, respectively. 
 
Figure IV-12. Simulations with different number of mental subgroups (trial 1) 
(as published in Mahardhika, et. al. (2017)) 
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Figure IV-13. AVG-RND-MAJ3 strategy with 1 most common value (trial 1) 
 
Figure IV-14. AVG-RND-MAJ3 strategy with 3 most common value (trial 1) 
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Figure IV-15. AVG-RND-MAJ3 strategy with 15 most common value (trial 1) 
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Figure IV-16. Simulations with different number of mental subgroups (trial 2) 
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Figure IV-17. AVG-RND-MAJ3 strategy with 1 most common value (trial 2) 
 
 
Figure IV-18. AVG-RND-MAJ3 strategy with 3 most common value (trial 2) 
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Figure IV-19. AVG-RND-MAJ3 strategy with 15 most common value (trial 2) 
 
By using Pearson correlation coefficient, it was found that the number of norm candidates 
has a strong positive correlation with the convergence of the norm (r = 0.988 and r = 0.928 
for trial 1 and 2 respectively). However, the average profit only has a weak or moderate 
positive correlation with the number of norm candidates (r = 0.308 and r = 0.554 for trial 
1 and 2 respectively). This implies that number of norm candidates (number of mental 
subgrouping formed) affects the convergence of action in the society. However, it does not 
affect the average profit gained by the society. 
4.2.4 Number of partners per agent 
Agents cannot observe each member of the society one by one. For each agent, society is 
represented by the partners that are linked to it. Therefore, the partners really affect how 
the agent view the society. In the default scenario, each agent has 50 partners. Other 
scenarios were tested where the number of partners are higher (150) or lower (10). 
Figure IV-20 shows the average profit and standard deviation of decision in the 800th 
iteration of the simulation with 10 partners per agent. The different colors represent 
different strategy for MSG-A. In the graph, all the dots with red color are in the same 
location with the base case (NOMBM, marked by the black star). The agents’ behavior with 
the ‘PERFECT’ strategy is the same with when they do not consider other agent’s intention 
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or expectation. Because the agent’s norm threshold stays the same, while the number of 
partners decreases significantly, there are not enough partners that have one same action to 
pass the threshold. Therefore, when making decision, agents will not find any candidate of 
norms in the candidate list. The decision they make will be influenced only by their own 
intention. 
Other interesting result is that other strategies either have lower profit or lower convergence 
than the base case. Some of them even have both lower profit and lower convergence. 
Furthermore, dots with green color have negative profits. 
 
 
Figure IV-20. Norm emergence at the 800th iteration with 10 partners per agent (MSG-A) 
Since the number of partners becomes lower while the thresholds are still the same, it 
becomes more difficult to find norm candidates. Besides, the individual values of partners’ 
decision become more important. This is why the result becomes more sensitive to the 
strategy of L1 inference (MSG-A), because it determines some of those values.  
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Figure IV-21 shows the profit of the agents using AVG-RND-RAND3 strategy with 10 
partners per agent. In Figure IV-20, this strategy is the point with standard deviation of 
27.86 and average profit of -1.96. The agents’ decisions are very diverse. However, unlike 
the one in PERFECT or NOMBM strategy, we see more dynamics in the process. This 
indicates that the agent’s decisions sometimes are still affected by their partners. Compared 
to the PERFECT or NOMBM where the decline of land’s profit is caused by a small portion 
of the society (the greedy agents), in other strategies, more agents acquire more land faster, 
so there is a point when the land passed 100% occupancy, thus the profit factor becomes 
negative. This can be seen in the graph where some agents actually decrease their land size.  
 
 
Figure IV-21. Strategy AVG-RND-RAND3 with 10 partners per agent 
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Figure IV-22 shows the result from the simulation with 150 partners per agent. The graph 
shows the strategy in MSG-A. In contrast with the 10-partner situation, all strategies in this 
simulation do not have negative profit. The situation is quite similar to the 50-partner case. 
This simulation is not sensitive to strategy in MSG-A because there are many partners 
relative to the norm threshold. Difference in the individual values will not significantly 
affect the norm candidates.  
 
Figure IV-22. Norm emergence at the 800th iteration with 150 partners per agent (MSG-A) 
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However, higher number of partners causes the simulation to be more sensitive to the 
strategies in MSG-C, in particular the THRES strategy. This situation is shown in Figure 
IV-23. This graph is the same with Figure IV-22 but the colors of the dots show strategies 
in MSG-C. One possible explanation of why the simulation is sensitive to THRES strategy 
is because there are a lot more norm candidates when the agents make decision. Other 
strategies only allow maximum three values of norm candidates.  
 
 
Figure IV-23. Norm emergence at the 800th iteration with 150 partners per agent (MSG-C) 
 
Figure IV-24 shows the norm emergence process for the bottom-left case (average profit = 
13.05, standard deviation of decision = 1.12, RND-AVG-MAJ3). For comparison, Figure 
IV-25 and Figure IV-26 show the same strategy but with 10 and 50 partners per agent, 
respectively.  
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Figure IV-24. RND-AVG-MAJ3, with 150 partners per agent 
 
 
Figure IV-25. RND-AVG-MAJ3, with 10 partners per agent 
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Figure IV-26.RND-AVG-MAJ3, with 50 partners per agent 
 
In general, result from 50 partners per agent and 150 partners per agent do not show a big 
difference. Figure IV-27 and Figure IV-28 show average profit and standard deviation, 
respectively, from all strategies in the 800th iteration for 10, 50, and 150 partners per agent. 
The x-axis shows the ID of the strategies as explained in Table IV-1. 
 
 
Figure IV-27. Profit comparison between different partners per agent 
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Figure IV-28. Convergence of decision between different partners per agent 
   
From the two graphs above, the tendency is clear that 50 partners per agent and 150 partners 
per agent do not show a big difference. On the other hand, 10 partners per agent shows a 
worse performance. As mentioned above, the lack of partners makes finding norms 
candidate difficult. Therefore, they take actions based on their own intention. 
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4.2.5 The role of the third layer 
In this simulation, the agents do not need to update the third layer. In this case, when 
deciding which values of land sizes get into the norm candidate set, the agents do not need 
to check whether the value exist in the third layer or not. The steps are shown in Figure 
IV-29. 
 
 
Figure IV-29. Decision making without considering the third layer 
 
In general, this simulation gives a slightly higher profit on average than the ones using L3. 
The average profit in this simulation is 36.46.  
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Figure IV-30. Norm emergence at the 800th iteration without L3 (MSG-C) 
 
Figure IV-30 shows the result of the simulation without L3. One noticeable feature in this 
simulation result is the ones with THRES strategy that have lower convergence than others. 
In the case of other strategies, even though the agents do not use the third layer, the number 
of norm candidates is still three. Not using the third layer will result in more norm 
candidates since there are less requirement for a value to become a norm candidate. But if 
the limit of norm candidate number is three, then it will not make any difference. However, 
in the case of THRES strategy, the number of norm candidates is not limited. Therefore, it 
yields more norm candidates, that results in more diverged decision. 
The best value in this simulation (the top-left side of Figure IV-30), consists of three 
strategies, as follows: 
 PERFECT-AVG-QUART 
 PERFECT-MCOM-QUART 
 PERFECT-RND-QUART 
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The land size of PERFECT-AVG-QUART strategy is shown in Figure IV-31. The graphs 
of the other two strategies also have a same appearance.  
 
Figure IV-31. PERFECT-AVG-QUART strategy without using L3 
 
Compared to other strategies and conditions tested in the current study, these three 
strategies yield the highest average profit (62.01) with the standard deviation of decision at 
3.03. The similarity between these three combinations are the PERFECT (MSG-A) and 
QUART (MSG-C) strategy.  
In the previous research (Mahardhika et al., 2016), it was found that in most of the time, 
human is not aware of the third layer. This is understandable because in normal situation, 
human will use the simplest way of thinking in solving problem, to reduce mental load 
(Kahneman, 2011). Besides, the deeper the layer an agent uses, the more effort is needed 
to be aware of it (Stiller & Dunbar, 2007). In the current study it is found that the highest 
profit can be reached exactly when the agents do not consider the third layer. This supports 
the claim that human cognition is efficient and yet still accurate (Matlin, 2012). However, 
it can be interpreted that L3 plays a role as the ‘brake’ to prevent overconsumption. With 
L3, agents are more considerate of others, therefore there will be less chance to 
overconsume the land. 
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As seen in the base case (Figure IV-2), without the second layer and third layer, the agents 
will overconsume the land. When the second layer is used without the third layer, the 
average profit becomes slightly higher than the simulation with the third layer. Since higher 
profit can lead to overconsumption, we can see that the lower layers play a very important 
role in controlling the society. This is an important result because such control does not 
require any force from authority, but instead, only relies on the awareness of the agents 
towards other agents’ expectation. Therefore, another possible way to avoid 
overconsumption beside having an authority, is by providing a support for awareness 
towards the lower layers. 
4.2.6 Composition of agents 
 
In the default scenario the ration between greedy, balanced, and modest agents is 3:3:4. 
Simulations with different agent-composition ratio have also been conducted. The first 
composition is 8:1:1 (greedy-dominant), followed by 1:1:8 (modest-dominant). The reason 
why such compositions are chosen is the resemblance of real situation. Purely homogenous 
society might not exist. However, it is still possible that a society is dominated by a certain 
type of people. Figure IV-32 and Figure IV-33 show the base case (decision without 
considering L2 and L3) for greedy-dominant and modest-dominant society, respectively. 
Figure IV-34 shows the full-scale graph for modest-dominant society. 
 
Figure IV-32. Base-case for greedy dominant society 
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Figure IV-33.Base-case for modest dominant society 
 
 
Figure IV-34. Base-case for modest dominant society (full scale) 
From the above cases, one interesting pattern is the existence of ‘free-rider’. In economics, 
free-rider problem occurs when those who benefit from resources, goods, or services do 
not pay for them (Baumol, 1952). In the context of our study, a free rider is defined as the 
minority group who keep adding the land while most of the society already stop acquiring 
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more land. In the greedy dominant case, three free-rider agents were found (indicated by 
the top blue line in Figure IV-32). In this case, these free-rider agents share two 
characteristics. The first is their low initial land size of 1 unit. The second is that they are 
all greedy agents. In the modest-dominant case, the top purple line shows one such agent. 
It has 4-unit initial land size and the greedy characteristic.  
Free riding problem is found more in the modest-dominant society. Since most of the agents 
are modest, they stopped quickly when they notice that the land quality starts to decrease. 
The minority greedy agents use this opportunity to keep acquiring more land up to more 
than 300 units per agent. Interestingly, in both greedy-dominant and modest-dominant 
society, the final average profits are no so different. Due to overconsumption, they yield 
only 6.12 and 7.02 units of profit in the end, respectively. The profit difference is shown in 
Figure IV-35. The difference however is in the convergence of decision. In the final 
iteration, the standard deviation of decision in the greedy dominant is 27.71 units, while 
the modest dominant has 74.35 units. 
 
Figure IV-35. Profit comparison between greedy dominant  
and modest dominant society in the base case 
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After simulating the base case, simulations with all the 48 strategies were conducted. The 
complete graphs are shown in Appendix B and C. The norms in the final iteration are shown 
in Figure IV-36 and Figure IV-37. 
 
Figure IV-36. Norms of the greedy dominant society in the 800th iteration 
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Figure IV-37. Norms of the modest dominant society in the 800th iteration 
 
From the above result, it can be concluded that indeed the modest society are more 
controlled. The combination of modest agent domination and awareness to the lower layers 
prevent the society from overconsumption in the long run. 
In both cases however, it is still clear that any mental subgrouping strategy still performs 
better in terms of profit and convergence of decision.  
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4.2.7 Network topology 
 
In this simulation, different network topologies are used to see their impact towards norm 
emergence. There are three network topologies used in this simulation. In all of these 
simulations, the number of partners is varied among agents, with the average of 30. The 
network is also bidirectional. If an agent A can observe B, it means that B can also observe 
A. The first topology is generated by is Watts-Strogatz model (Watts & Strogatz, 1998). 
This is a random graph generation model that produces graphs with small-world properties. 
Figure IV-38 shows the result. The different colors represent strategies of the MSG-A. 
 
Figure IV-38. Norm emergence in a small-world network (MSG-A) 
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The second topology is a random graph generated by Erdos-Renyi model (Erdős & Rényi, 
1960). The result is shown in Figure IV-39. 
 
 
Figure IV-39. Norm emergence in a random network (MSG-A) 
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The third topology is a graph generated by Barabasi-Albert model (Albert & Barabási, 
2002). This is an algorithm to generate a random scale-free networks. The main 
characteristic of such a network is that it contains a few main hubs that has unusually high 
degree as compared to other nodes of the network. The result is shown in Figure IV-40. 
 
Figure IV-40. Norm emergence in a scale-free network (MSG-A) 
In general, the results from the above three topologies are similar. Most of the red dots (the 
PERFECT strategy for MSG-A) have a low convergence. Such a phenomenon was not 
found in other cases. One similar case was the simulation with low number of partners, as 
explained in Section 4.2.4. Due to low number of partners, the norm emergence becomes 
very sensitive to the strategy in MSG-A. In the above three simulations, the number of 
partners are 30 on average, with 15 at the lowest and 92 at the highest. Even though the 
number of partners is not uniform, it seems that a low average number of partners still 
makes the emergence sensitive to the strategy in MSG-A.  
Another interesting result is the case in the scale-free network, shown by a red dot in the 
top-right side of Figure IV-40 (PERFECT-MCOM-RAND3). Among all other simulations, 
this has the highest average profit of 72.48, but also the lowest convergence, with the 
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standard deviation of 235.92. The agent with the highest profit acquired 2,098 units of land. 
The emergence of this strategy is shown in Figure IV-41. 
 
Figure IV-41. PERFECT-MCOM-RAND3 strategy in the scale free network 
 
The agents with the 8 highest profit and their characteristics are shown in Table IV-3. Those 
agents share some similar characteristics, which are high norm threshold but low number 
of partners relative to the average number of partners. Even though there are many other 
agents with similar characteristics that have low profit, this result shows an important 
insight. In a scale-free network, the agents with few partners but high norm threshold have 
the possibility to overconsume resources, regardless their personalities.    
Table IV-3. Agents with the highest profit in the scale-free network 
Agent Land 
No. of 
Partners 
Norm 
Threshold 
Personality 
agent198 2098 16 8 greedy 
agent179 1316 17 7 balanced 
agent194 1315 16 8 balanced 
agent159 1289 17 7 balanced 
agent182 1289 17 8 balanced 
agent186 524 16 7 modest 
agent154 499 20 8 modest 
agent167 499 16 7 modest 
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4.3 Interpretation and Implication 
In Chapter I, a sample case of societal phenomena caused by technological innovation was 
explained. The case was about online disinhibition effect in social media use. In regards to 
this case, the findings from the current study can give us some insight.  
The key findings and insights from the simulations are as follows. 
4.3.1 Norm emerges following the tipping concept 
Firstly, once the agents interact, it only takes a few iterations for them to converge. This is 
indicated by the sudden drop of standard deviation that always happens early in the 
simulation. After this major convergence, the agents will make smaller adjustment to try to 
conform more with each other. In some cases, the agents can increase their land size 
together in a similar rate. This phenomenon can happen due to the awareness to the lower 
layers. When the agents do not pay attention to the expectation of other agents, the society 
as a whole overconsume the resources.  
4.3.2 Importance of supporting awareness to the lower layers 
The second insight is, when agents only have few partners (relative to their norm 
threshold), it becomes difficult for them to find a norm candidate. The norm candidate that 
they will get will heavily rely on how they infer the intention and expectation of other 
agents when communication fails. Even though in online interaction users seem to have 
many more observable partners, the reality is different. When reading Facebook or Twitter 
for example, they are limited by the screen space. Moreover, recent online media has an 
algorithm to selectively show the posts. These limits the users’ ability to get enough 
information about the whole society.  
From the two insights above, the key point to intervene such ‘overconsumption’ situation 
and to allow the society to have a norm is by focusing on the awareness on the lower layers. 
Even in face-to-face interaction, humans are rarely pay attention to lower layers, especially 
the third layer (Mahardhika et al., 2016). Due to the factors mentioned above, awareness 
to the lower layers become much worse.  
4.3.3 Importance of supporting inference strategy 
The third insight is from the mental subgrouping strategy. Form the result of discussed in 
Section 4.2.2, we can see that mental subgrouping process using the ‘random pick’ strategy 
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shows less sudden change in the emergence of society. Since one key point of norm 
dynamics is tipping (sudden change), it can be suspected that mental subgrouping is not 
done by random process, but rather through a more systematic process (e.g. based on 
similarity or centrality). Recently, online media try to prioritize topics or posts to be shown 
to their user. Usually the algorithm is by choosing topics that are similar the ones that the 
user has watched, or topics that is trending. This algorithm creates a problem called ‘filter 
bubble’ (Pariser, 2011). This problem enhances self-confirmation bias among internet user 
because user will see posts or topics that are in line with their interest. In the view of the 
insights from the current study, this filter bubble heavily influences mental subgrouping. In 
the current study, the posts or topics is represented by the norms in the simulation. Users 
will find similarity or centrality of those topics or posts. However, since those topics have 
been systematically chosen, the users have no choice but to create mental subgrouping 
based on what the system has chosen.  
This is one important point for intervention. On the one hand, the algorithm to choose the 
post that will be shown to the users can be used to direct the society towards a certain trend. 
For example, instead of showing posts that are similar to users’ interests, it shows posts 
that have been decided as ‘good for the society’. However, on the other hand this is risky 
because the authority or institution may abuse this feature to serve their own view. 
Another possible intervention is by letting the users view the posts or topics as it is, without 
sophisticated filtering algorithm. In this way, users’ mental subgrouping will have less bias. 
One problem is that due to limited space of showing posts, online media are still forced to 
make prioritization of posts. One suggestion for these online media is to create a support 
for the users to see more balanced topics or posts. 
4.3.4 Insight for the Online Disinhibition Effect (ODE) 
In the case of online disinhibition effect, we can interpret the freedom in using the internet 
as the limited resources. Overconsumed freedom means that everybody behaves only 
according their own intention. Similar to the land in the simulation, nobody knows the limit 
of freedom, but when everybody overuses it, everybody will start to feel that the 
environment (the social media) becomes less comfortable. The norm that the internet users 
need to find is “how much freedom can I use in online media?”. 
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In his work of ODE, Suler (2005) mentioned that there are six factors causing ODE. They 
are “dissociative anonymity”, “invisibility”, “asynchronicity”, “solipsistic introjection”, 
“dissociative imagination”, and “minimization of status and authority”. 
All of them can be related to the process of updating the second and third layer. In 
“dissociative anonymity”, “invisibility”, and “disassociate imagination”, users separate 
themselves from their online being. They disassociate their intention (first layer) and the 
expectation towards them (third layer). In their mind, the expectation is directed towards 
their online presence instead of themselves. Therefore, their final action does not consider 
the lower layers, in particular the third layer.  
In “asynchronicity”, users fail to have an immediate response from the other users when 
discussing about a subject. This disturbs the process of immediately understand what other 
people expect about the subject (second layer), also what other people expect from that 
particular user (third layer). 
In “solipsistic introjection”, users tend to feel that everything they read in the internet ‘has 
merged’ into their mind. This is one form of self-confirmation bias. Users will assign a 
visual image of the person they are interacting with, solely from the limited information 
available through the screen, even from a short comment. This creates an inaccuracy in 
inferring the type of person they are communicating with. Thus, this also creates an 
inaccuracy in inferring other necessary information for the lower layers. The “minimization 
of status and authority” also has similar effect. Online users fail to recognize the different 
status of people they interact with, thus create an inaccuracy in the inference process. 
In this sense, the ODE can be seen as a societal phenomenon where the users fail to make 
decision and action based on the lower layers of the mutual belief structure. As shown in 
the base case (Figure IV-2), when the lower layers are not considered, the whole society 
overuse the resources. In the ODE case, they overuse their freedom. It is necessary for the 
designer of the online media system to think about the support for L2 and L3 awareness to 
reduce ODE.   
4.3.5 Insight for society of artificial autonomous agents 
The findings in this study also give a valuable insight for creating a society of autonomous 
agents. First, by embedding the mechanism of mutual belief, autonomous agents like self-
driving cars can quickly reach a convergence of behavior. With mental subgrouping 
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behavior this can be reach without communicating with all other agents in the society, but 
instead only a portion of them is enough. This will reduce computational and 
communication cost between agents. Reaching a convergence quickly is good for the whole 
society since behavior of other agents will be more predictable.  
Second, it is found that proportion between number of partners and norm threshold 
determines the norm candidates. Unlike human, artificial autonomous agents like self-
driving cars do not have a fixed threshold of norm. Therefore, it becomes important for the 
designer of those agents to determine this value when implementing mutual belief structure. 
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Chapter V 
LIMITATION AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
This study tries to understand the mechanism of norm emergence from the perspective of 
individual member of the society. The understanding is necessary to get an insight of what 
kind of intervention is necessary to allow the society to reach a norm. 
To reach the goal, however, several factors are not considered in the current study and need 
to be addressed in further research.  
5.1 Emotion Factor 
First of all, even though the current model is able to explain the cognition of a society from 
the perspective of individual members’ cognition and their interaction, it does not take into 
account the factor of emotion. Emotion is recognized as one of the important factors in the 
construction of the so-called “collective mind” (Blumer, 1951; Freud, 1921). 
Even though emotion can be modeled as a form of cognition (status of the layers), the 
current model is not adequate to model the relation between agent’s emotion and the 
decision they make. Emotion in this sense can also include the interpersonal relationship 
between the agents. Humans tend to be affected by emotional closeness in weighing the 
importance of information from people around them. Interpersonal communication affects 
human attitudes and decision making (Asch, 1956; Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955). Such a factor 
was not included in the current model. In the future research, the agents can be modeled to 
have different relationship, thus a different weight for considering the partner’s 
expectation. 
5.2 Variation of Mental Subgrouping Strategy 
The second is about the variation of mental subgrouping strategy. As mentioned before, the 
mechanism of mental subgrouping is still unknown. It is suspected that it is based on 
similarity or centrality of the partner’s cognition. In the current study, only majority rule, 
average, or quartile was used as mental subgrouping strategy. In the further research, it is 
necessary to find the factors and mechanism affecting the mental subgrouping process. 
Emotional factor and interpersonal closeness may also affect how mental subgrouping is 
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done. Further empirical research need to be done to find out other strategies of mental 
subgrouping. 
5.3 Network Dynamics 
The third is about the partners of the agents. In real life, over time people move and change 
their partner. It is also possible that people only make friends only with those who have 
similar view or opinion (Hamm & V., 2000; Umphress, Smith-Crowe, Brief, Dietz, & 
Watkins, 2007). Therefore, there might be a feedback loop between the norm adopted from 
society by an agent and also the partners that this agent makes friends with. In the current 
study however, the network is fixed throughout the simulation. Agents cannot change their 
partners regardless the difference in their decision. And since the current network is not 
affected by the similarity of agents (characteristics, actions, etc.), such feedback loop is not 
modeled. Such factor should be addressed in the further research. 
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Chapter VI 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This research attempts to model the emergence of societal phenomena using a human 
cognition model. The model focuses on the bottom-up emergence aspect by implementing 
mutual belief and mental subgrouping. The model is implemented using a multi-agent 
social simulation. In particular, the simulation deals with the combination of different 
mental subgrouping strategies and the effect to the emergence of a norm.  
There are several key novelties in the proposed models, as follows: 
 Norm is viewed from the subjective perspective rather than objective perspective.  
 The model follows the notion that norms consist of one’s intention, empirical 
expectation, and normative expectation. 
 The model gives a reductivist point of view. It is able to reduce a cognition of a 
society (the cognition behind the societal phenomena) into the cognition of the 
individual members of the society and relationship between them. 
 The model incorporates the ‘mental subgrouping’ process, which is a natural 
process in human’s mind when they interact with each other. 
From the modeling and simulation, there are several key findings: 
 Once the agents interact, it only takes a few iterations for them to converge. This is 
indicated by the sudden drop of standard deviation that always happens early in the 
simulation. After this major convergence, the agents will make smaller adjustment 
to try to conform with each other. In some cases, the agents can increase their land 
size together in a similar rate.     
 Mental subgrouping process and awareness to the lower layers plays an important 
role in the norm emergence in the society.  
 Mental subgrouping process using the ‘random pick’ strategy shows less sudden 
change in the emergence of society. Since one key point of norm dynamics is tipping 
(sudden change), it can be suspected that mental subgrouping is not done by random 
process, but rather through a more systematic process (e.g. based on similarity or 
centrality) 
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 When agents only have few partners (relative to their norm threshold), it becomes 
difficult for them to find a norm candidate. The norm candidate that they will get 
will heavily rely on how they infer the intention and expectation of other agents 
when communication fails. 
 The awareness to the lower layers acts as a brake to control the society and prevent 
overconsumption of resources 
For the presented case study of the Online Disinhibition Effect, the findings in this research 
supports the suspected cause mentioned in the original work about ODE. Lack of awareness 
to the lower layers allows people to overconsume the public resources, in this case the 
freedom of speech and act in the online media. The suggestion proposed from the current 
study is to provide support for good awareness towards the lower layers of mutual belief 
structure. 
As for limitation of this study, there are three points: 
 Emotional factor 
 Variation of mental subgrouping strategy 
 Network dynamics 
91 
REFERENCES 
Aarts, H., & Dijksterhuis, A. (2003). The silence of the library: environment, situational 
norm, and social behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 84(1), 18–
28. http://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.84.1.18 
Ahmad, A., Zaliman, M., Yusof, M., Ahmad, M. S., Ahmed, M., & Mustapha, A. (2011). 
Resolving conflicts between personal and normative goals in normative agent systems. 
In 2011 7th International Conference on Information Technology in Asia (pp. 1–6). 
IEEE. http://doi.org/10.1109/CITA.2011.5999538 
Albert, R., & Barabási, A.-L. (2002). Statistical mechanics of complex networks. Reviews 
of Modern Physics, 74(1), 47–97. http://doi.org/10.1103/RevModPhys.74.47 
Andrighetto, G., Conte, R., & Turrini, P. (2007). Emergence In the Loop: simulating the 
two way dynamics of norm innovation. In Normative Multi-Agent Systems (pp. 1–19). 
Dagstuhl, Germany. 
Andrighetto, G., Villatoro, D., & Conte, R. (2010). Norm internalization in artificial 
societies. AI Communications - European Workshop on Multi-Agent Systems 
(EUMAS), 23(4), 325–339. http://doi.org/10.3233/AIC-2010-0477 
Asch, S. E. (1956). Studies of independence and conformity: I. A minority of one against a 
unanimous majority. Psychological Monographs: General and Applied, 70(9), 1–70. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/h0093718 
Axelrod, R. (1986). An Evolutionary Approach to Norms. American Political Science 
Review, 80(4), 1095–1111. http://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055400185016 
Axelrod, R. (1997). The Complexity of Cooperation: Agent-Based Models of Competition 
and Collaboration. Princeton University Press. 
Baumol, W. (1952). Welfare Economics and the Theory of the State. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press. 
BBC Asia. (2017). How fake news and hoaxes have tried to derail Jakarta’s election - BBC 
News. Retrieved April 19, 2017, from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-
39176350 
Bianco, W. T., & Canon, D. T. (2013). Public Opinion. In American Politics Today (3rd 
ed.). New York: W. W. Norton. 
Bicchieri, C. (2006). The Grammar of Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bicchieri, C. (2010). Norms, preferences, and conditional behavior. Politics, Philosophy & 
Economics, 9(3), 297–313. http://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X10369276 
Blumer, H. (1951). Collective Behavior. In A. M. Lee (Ed.), Principles of Sociology (pp. 
67–121). New York: Barnes & Noble. 
Boman, M. (1999). Norms in artificial decision making. Artificial Intelligence and Law, 
7(1), 17–35. http://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008311429414 
Bradbery, J., Turnbull, J., & Deuter, M. (1948). Oxford Learner’s Dictionary. Retrieved 
April 30, 2017, from http://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com 
Broersen, J., Dastani, M., & van der Torre, L. (2001). Resolving Conflicts between Beliefs, 
Obligations, Intentions, and Desires (pp. 568–579). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. 
92 
http://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44652-4_50 
Castelfranchi, C., Conte, R., & Paolucci, M. (1998). Normative reputation and the costs of 
compliance. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 1(3). Retrieved 
from http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/1/3/3.html 
Chalub, F. A. C. C., Santos, F. C., & Pacheco, J. M. (2006). The evolution of norms. Journal 
of Theoretical Biology, 241(2), 233–240. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2005.11.028 
Chant, S. R., & Ernst, Z. (2007). Group Intention as Equilibria. Philosopical Studies, 
133(1), 95–109. 
Cialdini, R. B. (2009). Influence: Science and Practice (5th ed.). Allyn & Bacon. 
Cialdini, R. B., & Goldstein, N. J. (2004). Social influence: compliance and conformity. 
Annual Review of Psychology, 55(1974), 591–621. 
http://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.55.090902.142015 
Cialdini, R. B., & Trost, M. R. (1998). Social influence: Social norms, conformity and 
compliance. McGraw-Hill. Retrieved from http://psycnet.apa.org/psycinfo/1998-
07091-021 
Coleman, J. (1990). Foundations of Social Theory. Harvard: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press. 
Darley, J. M., & Latane, B. (1968). Bystander intervention in emergencies: Diffusion of 
responsibility. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 8(4, Pt.1), 377–383. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/h0025589 
Dollard, J., & Miller, N. E. (1943). Social Learning and Imitation. American Anthropologist, 
45(1). Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/662883 
Epstein, J. M. (2001). Learning to Be Thoughtless: Social Norms and Individual 
Computation. Computational Economics, 18(1), 9–24. 
http://doi.org/10.1023/A:1013810410243 
Erdős, P., & Rényi, A. (1960). On the Evolution of Random Graphs. Publication of The 
Mathematical Institute of The Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 17--61. 
Flentge, F., Polani, D., & Uthmann, T. (2001). Modelling the emergence of possession 
norms using memes. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 4(4). 
Retrieved from http://researchprofiles.herts.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/modelling-
the-emergence-of-possession-norms-using-memes(1dcbab58-bf08-43ae-9679-
9b1b50ecc1cb).html 
Forsyth, D. R. (2010). Group Dynamics (6th ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, Cengage 
Learning. 
Freud, S. (1921). Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego. Vienna: International 
Psychoanalytic Publishing House. 
Furda, A., & Vlacic, L. (2009). Towards increased road safety: Real-time decision making 
for driverless city vehicles. In 2009 IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man 
and Cybernetics (pp. 2421–2426). IEEE. 
http://doi.org/10.1109/ICSMC.2009.5346395 
Goldstein, N. J., Cialdini, R. B., & Griskevicius, V. (2008). A Room with a Viewpoint: 
Using Social Norms to Motivate Environmental Conservation in Hotels. Journal of 
Consumer Research, 35(3), 472–482. http://doi.org/10.1086/586910 
93 
Hales, D. (2002). Group Reputation Supports Beneficent Norms. Journal of Artificial 
Societies and Social Simulation, 5(4), 4. Retrieved from 
http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/5/4/4.html 
Hamm, J. V., & V., J. (2000). Do birds of a feather flock together? The variable bases for 
African American, Asian American, and European American adolescents’ selection of 
similar friends. Developmental Psychology, 36(2), 209–219. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.36.2.209 
Hardin, G. (2009). The Tragedy of the Commons. Journal of Natural Resources Policy 
Research, 1(3), 243–253. http://doi.org/10.1080/19390450903037302 
Hoffmann, M. J. (2003). Entrepreneurs and norm dynamics: an agent-based model of the 
norm life cycle. 
Hollander, C. D., & Wu, A. S. (2011). The Current State of Normative Agent-Based 
Systems. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 14(2). 
http://doi.org/10.18564/jasss.1750 
Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 
Kanno, T., Furuta, K., & Chou, T.-H. (2013). A model of the perception gap between 
different actors. International Journal of Quality and Service Sciences, 5(4), 382–394. 
http://doi.org/10.1108/IJQSS-08-2012-0009 
Kanno, T., Furuta, K., & Kitahara, Y. (2013). A model of team cognition based on mutual 
beliefs. Theoretical Issues in Ergonomics Science, 14(1), 38–52. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/1464536X.2011.573010 
Katz, E., & Lazarsfeld, P. F. (1955). Personal Influence: The Part Played by People in the 
Flow of Mass Communications. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press. 
Le Bon, G. (1960). The Crowd: A Study of The Popular Mind. New York: Viking Press. 
Lickel, B., Hamilton, D. L., Wieczorkowska, G., Lewis, A., Sherman, S. J., & Uhles, A. N. 
(2000). Varieties of groups and the perception of group entitativity. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 78(2), 223–246. http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-
3514.78.2.223 
Lofland, J. (1985). Protest: Studies of Collective Behavior and Social Movements. New 
Brunswick: Transactions Publisher. 
López, F. L. y, Luck, M., & d’Inverno, M. (2002). Constraining autonomy through norms. 
In Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and 
multiagent systems part 2 - AAMAS ’02 (p. 674). New York, New York, USA: ACM 
Press. http://doi.org/10.1145/544862.544905 
Mahardhika, D., & Kanno, T. (2016). Group Level Versus Society Level of Computing. In 
M. Antona & C. Stephanidis (Eds.), Universal Access in Human-Computer 
Interaction. Methods, Techniques, and Best Practices (pp. 1–8). Switzerland: Springer 
International Publishing. 
Mahardhika, D., Kanno, T., & Furuta, K. (2016). Team Cognition Model based on Mutual 
Beliefs and Mental Subgrouping. Journal of Interaction Science, 4(1), 1–10. 
http://doi.org/10.1186/s40166-016-0014-6 
Mahardhika, D., Kanno, T., & Furuta, K. (2017). A Multi-Agent Simulation of the 
Formation of Society-Level Phenomena based on Group Cognition Model. In 2nd 
International Conference on Social Informatics and Systems Science. Hamamatsu, 
94 
Japan. 
Mahmoud, M. A., Ahmad, M. S., Zaliman, M., Yusoff, M., & Mustapha, A. (2014). A 
Review of Norms and Normative Multiagent Systems. The Scientific World Journal, 
2014. http://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2014/684587 
Matlin, M. W. (2012). Cognition (8th ed.). Wiley. 
Melnyk, V. (2011). What is normal to do? : social norms as determinants of consumer 
decision making. University of Wageningen, The Netherland. 
Meyer, J.-J. C., & Wieringa, R. (1994). Deontic logic in computer science : normative 
system specification. In International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer 
Science (p. 317). Amsterdam, Netherlands: J. Wiley. 
Milgram, S., & Toch, H. (1969). Collective behavior: Crowds and social movements. In G. 
Lindzey & E. Aronson (Eds.), The Handbook of Social Psychology, Volume 4 (pp. 
553–555). Reading: Addison Wesley. 
Mohammed, S., Ferzandi, L., & Hamilton, K. (2010). Metaphor No More: A 15-Year 
Review of the Team Mental Model Construct. Journal of Management, 36(4), 876–
910. http://doi.org/10.1177/0149206309356804 
Nakamaru, M., & Levin, S. A. (2004). Spread of two linked social norms on complex 
interaction networks. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 230(1), 57–64. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2004.04.028 
Neumann, M. (2010). A classification of normative architectures. In K. Takadama, C. 
Cioffi-Revilla, & G. Deffuant (Eds.), Simulating Interacting Agents and Social 
Phenomena: The Second World Congress (pp. 3–18). 
Pariser, E. (2011). The Filter Bubble: What The Internet is Hiding from You. Penguin UK. 
Rakusen, I., Devichand, M., Sampat, R., & Susilo, M. (2014). #BBCtrending: Arrested for 
calling Indonesian city “idiotic” - BBC News. Retrieved April 19, 2017, from 
http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-29035858 
Ronson, J. (2015). How One Stupid Tweet Blew Up Justine Sacco’s Life. Retrieved April 
19, 2017, from https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/15/magazine/how-one-stupid-
tweet-ruined-justine-saccos-life.html?_r=0 
Saam, N. J., & Harrer, A. (1999). Simulating norms, social inequality, and functional 
change in artificial societies. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 2(1). 
Retrieved from http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/2/1/2.html 
Sadri, F., Stathis, K., & Toni, F. (2006). Normative KGP agents. Computational & 
Mathematical Organization Theory, 12(2–3), 101–126. 
http://doi.org/10.1007/s10588-006-9539-5 
Savarimuthu, B. T. R., & Cranefield, S. (2011). Norm creation, spreading and emergence: 
A survey of simulation models of norms in multi-agent systems. Multiagent and Grid 
Systems, 7(1), 21–54. http://doi.org/10.3233/MGS-2011-0167 
Savarimuthu, B. T. R., Cranefield, S., Purvis, M. A., & Purvis, M. K. (2010). Obligation 
Norm Identification in Agent Societies. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social 
Simulation, 13(4). http://doi.org/10.18564/jasss.1659 
Savarimuthu, B. T. R., Cranefield, S., Purvis, M., & Purvis, M. (2008). Role Model Based 
Mechanism for Norm Emergence in Artificial Agent Societies. In Coordination, 
95 
Organizations, Institutions, and Norms in Agent Systems III (pp. 203–217). Berlin, 
Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg. http://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-79003-
7_15 
Savarimuthu, B. T. R., Purvis, M., Purvis, M., & Cranefield, S. (2009). Social Norm 
Emergence in Virtual Agent Societies. In M. Baldoni, T. C. Son, M. B. van Riemsdijk, 
& M. Winikoff (Eds.), Declarative Agent Languages and Technologies VI (Vol. 5397). 
Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg. http://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-
93920-7 
Schelling, T. C. (1960). The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Sen, S., & Airiau, S. S. (2007). Emergence of norms through social learning. In 
Proceedings of The Twentieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence 
(IJCAI) (pp. 1507–1512). AAAI Press. http://doi.org/10.1007/s10458-013-9237-x 
Smelser, N. J. (1962). Theory of Collective Behavior (III). Glencoe: Free Press. 
Stiller, J., & Dunbar, R. I. M. (2007). Perspective-taking and memory capacity predict 
social network size. Social Networks, 29(1), 93–104. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.socnet.2006.04.001 
Suler, J. (2005). The online disinhibition effect. International Journal of Applied 
Psychoanalytic Studies, 2(2), 184–188. http://doi.org/10.1002/aps.42 
Terano, T. (2008). Beyond the KISS Principle for Agent-Based Social Simulation. Journal 
of Socio-Informatics, 1(1), 175–187. 
Tuomela, R. (2007). The philosophy of sociality: The shared point of view. Oxford 
University Press. 
Turner, R. H., & Killian, L. M. (1993). Collective Behavior (3rd ed.). Englewood, New 
Jersey, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 
Umphress, E. E., Smith-Crowe, K., Brief, A. P., Dietz, J., & Watkins, M. B. (2007). When 
birds of a feather flock together and when they do not: Status composition, social 
dominance orientation, and organizational attractiveness. Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 92(2), 396–409. http://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.92.2.396 
Verhagen, H. (2001). Simulation of the Learning of Norms. Social Science Computer 
Review, 19(3), 296–306. http://doi.org/10.1177/089443930101900305 
Von Wright, G. H. (1951). Deontic Logic. Mind, 60(237), 1–15. 
Watts, D. J., & Strogatz, S. H. (1998). Collective dynamics of “small-world” networks. 
Nature, 393(6684), 440–442. http://doi.org/10.1038/30918 
 
  
96 
 
97 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX A 
Norm Emergence for All Strategies in The Default Scenario 
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APPENDIX B 
Norm Emergence for All Strategies in The Greedy Dominant Society 
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APPENDIX C 
Norm Emergence for All Strategies in The Modest Dominant Society 
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